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THESIS

WE BOMB, THEREFORE WE ARE:
THE EVOLUTION OF
TERRORIST GROUP LIFE CYCLES

by

Charles E. Lockett

March, 1994

Thesis Advisor

Gordon H. McCormick

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We Bomb, Therefore We Are:
The Evolution of
Terrorist Group Life Cycles

by

Charles E. Lockett
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.A., Allegheny College

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of


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


March 1994

Author:



Charles E. Lockett

Approved by:


Gordon H. McCormick, Thesis Advisor
Nancy C. Roberts, Second Reader

Thomas C. Bruneau, Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs

ABSTRACT

The potential for conflict between the United States and terrorist groups is higher than in the recent past. This thesis attempts to understand the underlying causes for the rise and fall of terrorist groups by developing a theory that explains the evolution of their life cycles. This thesis argues that once organizational issues take priority over instrumental ones terrorism becomes self-defeating and survival threatening for the terrorist group. Since this priority shift occurs as a natural consequence of their internal dynamics, the seeds of a terrorist group's destruction exist within the group itself. Factors external to the terrorist group, however, can suppress the germination of those seeds and allow the group to survive. The dynamic interaction of these internal and external influences shapes a terrorist group's life cycle. Understanding the nature of this process is important for the design of counterterrorist policy.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis is designed to achieve two purposes. The first is to develop a theory that explains terrorist group life cycles. The goal of this theory is to understand the changing nature of terrorist group violence and associated influence in order to explain why these groups rise and fall. The second purpose is to use this understanding to suggest ways in which counterterrorist policy might be improved.

This thesis develops a theory of terrorist group life cycles that synthesizes two competing approaches to terrorism. The *instrumental* approach considers terrorist group behavior to be a function of strategic choice. Terrorist group strategic goals are those that represent the desires and needs of the terrorist group's constituency and those intended to influence government behavior. The *organizational* approach considers terrorist group behavior to be a function of their internal dynamics. Organizational goals are those that represent the needs of the terrorist group, the most basic of which is group survival.

This theory synthesizes both approaches in order to understand the evolution of terrorist group life cycles. It has been argued that factors internal to the terrorist group affect strategic reasoning and provoke actions that are counterproductive to the group's strategic goals. This theory moves beyond that debate and argues that not only do internal factors affect strategic reasoning, but at some point in the terrorist group's life cycle, organizational issues tend to take precedence over instrumental ones.

Instrumental and organizational issues are not by definition contradictory, but can become so. This theory argues that once organizational issues take priority over instrumental ones terrorism becomes self-defeating and survival-threatening. Since this priority shift occurs as a natural consequence of their internal dynamics, the seeds of a terrorist group's destruction exist within the group itself. Factors external to the terrorist group, however, may suppress germination of those seeds and allow the group to survive. The dynamic interaction of these internal and external influences shapes a terrorist group's life cycle.

Government action can suppress the seeds of a terrorist group's self-destruction. The government exists on the horns of a dilemma. On one hand, the government must act to suppress the terrorist group in order to retain its legitimacy. On the other, if the government acts too violently, it runs the risk of jeopardizing its legitimacy. Perhaps the most significant factor that allows terrorist groups to survive is government action which is excessive and inappropriate for the situation.

This thesis suggests a mechanism with which correct government policy can be used to manage terrorist groups. It has been noted that terrorism ends when the bonds that link members of the group dissolve or when beliefs that justify violence break down. The terrorist group and its members, must ultimately abandon the cause, or at least the methods used to pursue the cause. This thesis suggests that it is possible to manage the conditions under which terrorists make or are forced to make that decision. Perhaps the most important conclusion is that a terrorist group's lack of control provides a mechanism with which a terrorist group can be controlled.

I. INTRODUCTION

The fall of the Berlin Wall initiated wide ranging discussion concerning the shape of the new world order. Is the international environment in a state of disequilibrium? If so, how will it look once equilibrium is reestablished? Will the nature of power change? What will be the new power relationships? Will states exist, or will they fragment and consolidate into nations? Will other states consolidate into regional and supraregional blocs? The list goes on.

These questions, although important, are premature. So close to the origin of change, discussion must focus on the nature of the environment as it attempts to achieve equilibrium. From this point of view, fragmentation along one series of faults (nationalistic, ethnic, resource, environmental, etc.) and consolidation along another (transnational movements, economic blocs, etc.) generates instability. The result is continuing disorder, accelerating change, and increasing violence.

Schelling argues that the purpose of violence is to influence.¹ He describes violence as a form of bargaining in which the threat is withheld, withdrawn, or intensified depending on the adversary's response. Violence must elicit a favorable response in an

¹Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 1-34.

adversary in order to be effective. What matters most in the final analysis is not violence itself, but its influence on adversary behavior.

Terrorism is a form of violence. Although a universal definition of terrorism does not exist, "violence" is the most commonly accepted component.² In Schelling's terms, one purpose of terrorism is influence. With this in mind, terrorism is defined as a strategy in which violence is used against a symbolic target in order to influence a larger audience for political ends. A terrorist group is a group that uses terrorism as the primary strategy of achieving those ends.³

This thesis is designed to achieve two purposes. The first is to develop a theory that explains terrorist group life cycles. The goal of this theory is to understand the changing nature of terrorist group violence and associated influence in order to explain why these groups rise and fall. The second purpose is to use this understanding to suggest ways in which counterterrorist policy might be improved.

²In Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*, 2nd ed., (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), 1-32, the authors conducted a content analysis of 109 definitions of terrorism. The most common element of that analysis was "violence, force," appearing in 83.5% of the definitions.

³Terrorism is a strategy in that the behavior is purposive. Violent action is the method of choice. The target attacked may be only symbolically related to the audience to be influenced. The end is political as opposed to criminal or psychotic. A terrorist group contrasts with a revolutionary or other type of group that may use terrorism as one of many tactics to achieve its goals.

The theory developed in this thesis falls within the framework of two competing theoretical approaches to terrorism.⁴ According to the *instrumental* approach, terrorist group behavior is a function of strategic choice. Terrorist groups act collectively, applying a means and ends logic in which terrorism becomes the means of choice to influence the government. The rise and fall of the terrorist group is associated with an action-reaction cycle between the group and the government, and the group's ability to achieve its stated political goals. In the context of this thesis, terrorist group strategic goals are those that represent the desires and needs of the terrorist group's constituency, and those intended to influence government behavior.

⁴For comparative analysis see Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," in *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, ed. D. C. Rapaport, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 13-31; and Thomas P. Kissane, "The Theoretical Literature on Terrorism: A Sociological Interpretation," Ph.D. diss., Fordham University, 1989. Various aspects of the instrumental approach are highlighted in Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. W. Reich, Woodrow Wilson Center Series, (New York: Cambridge University Press and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1990), 7-24. Various aspects of the organizational approach are highlighted in Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism," *Orbis*, v. 29, n. 3, Fall 1985, 465-88; Kent Layne Oots, *A Political Organization Approach to Transnational Terrorism*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986.); Jerrold M. Post, "Group and Organisational Dynamics of Political Terrorism: Implications for Counterterrorist Policy," in *Contemporary Research in Terrorism*, eds., P. Wilkinson and A. D. Stewart, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), 307-17; William L. Waugh, Jr., "The Values in Violence: Organizational and Political Objectives of Terrorist Groups," *Conflict Quarterly*, v. 3, n. 4, Summer 1983, 5-19; John B. Wolf, "Organization and Management Practices of Urban Terrorist Groups," *Terrorism*, v. 1, n. 2, 1978, 169-86; and J. K. Zawodny, "Internal Organizational Problems and the Sources of Tensions of Terrorist Movements as Catalysts of Violence," *Terrorism*, v. 1, n. 3/4, 1978, 277-85.

According to the *organizational* approach, terrorist group behavior is a function of its internal dynamics. Terrorism becomes a means of managing issues of organizational structure and process, individual need, and group dynamics. External pressures, although increasing the terrorist group's cohesion, aggravate these organizational issues, increasing the requirement for more terrorism. The rise and fall of the terrorist group is associated with its organizational viability; the group falls when it disintegrates. In the context of this thesis, organizational goals are those that represent the needs of the terrorist group, the most basic of which is group survival.

This thesis synthesizes both approaches in order to understand the evolution of terrorist group life cycles. Crenshaw argues that factors internal to the terrorist group affect strategic reasoning and provoke actions that are counterproductive to the group's strategic goals.⁵ This thesis moves beyond Crenshaw's theory and argues that not only do internal factors affect strategic reasoning, but at some point in the terrorist group's life cycle, organizational issues take precedence over instrumental ones.

Instrumental and organizational issues are not by definition contradictory, but as developed in this thesis become so. This thesis argues that once organizational issues take priority over instrumental ones terrorism becomes self-defeating and survival-threatening. Since this priority shift occurs as a natural consequence of their internal

⁵Martha Crenshaw, "Decisions to Use Terrorism: Psychological Constraints on Instrumental Reasoning," *International Social Movement Research*, v. 4, ed. D. della Porta, (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1992), 29-41.

dynamics, the seeds of a terrorist group's destruction exist within the group itself.⁶ Factors external to the terrorist group, however, may suppress germination of those seeds and allow the group to persist. The dynamic interaction of these internal and external influences shapes a terrorist group's life cycle.

This theory is based on four assumptions. First, terrorist groups are political organizations. As such, the terrorist group is perceived as providing some service to a constituency.⁷ Second, terrorist groups are not autonomous entities, but are linked to society if only tenuously or transiently.⁸ Third, terrorist groups have strategic goals which

⁶This argument is advanced by Ted Robert Gurr, "Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases," in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. W. Reich, Woodrow Wilson Center Series, (New York: Cambridge University Press and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1990), 102; and Zawodny, "Internal Organizational Problems," 282.

⁷Crenshaw, "Organizational Approach," 466, argues that terrorist groups are similar to other voluntary political organizations in that they have defined decision making structures and processes, members occupy functionally differentiated roles, recognized leaders occupy formal positions of authority, and the group collectively pursues goals and assumes collective responsibility for actions. The roots of this argument lie in James Q. Wilson, *Political Organizations* (New York: Basic Books, 1973); and Sidney Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior: A Study of Leadership*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961). Kent Layne Oots, "Organizational Perspectives on the Formation and Disintegration of Terrorist Groups," *Terrorism*, v. 12, 1989, 139-40, argues that terrorist group goals, as in any political interest group, take the form of collective public goods. The roots of this argument lie in Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Harvard Economic Studies, v. 124, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.)

⁸Jeffrey Ian Ross and Ted Robert Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States," *Comparative Politics*, v. 21, n. 4, July 1989, 407. note that terrorist groups "rarely are autistic, in the sense of being wholly disconnected from the rest of society. Rather, they virtually always believe they are acting in the interests of some larger group."

it wants to succeed in achieving. Success for a terrorist group is defined in terms of its ability to influence government behavior in ways that are beneficial to their constituency. Finally, as a prerequisite for success, terrorist groups want to survive.⁹ Terrorist groups are not irrational entities which purposively sacrifice that goal in order to achieve other objectives.

Since the terrorist group is the primary focus of this thesis, it is important to differentiate between various types. This thesis uses Waldmann's typology and divides terrorist groups into two major types: sociorevolutionary and ethnic.¹⁰ Sociorevolutionary terrorist groups are those whose primary goal is transformation of the political and social structure of society. Ethnic groups are those whose primary goal is increased autonomy or independence for the ethnic group. Sociorevolutionary groups are ideological in nature; ethnic groups are nationalist.

⁹Wilson, *Political Organizations*, 10, defines the basic goal of any organization as survival and argues that survival requires that membership be perceived as worthwhile which, under certain circumstances, may only be possible if the group pursues specific political objectives.

¹⁰Peter Waldmann, "Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism: A Comparison of Structures," *International Social Movement Research*, v. 4, ed. D. della Porta, (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1992), 237-57. This division roughly corresponds to the psychodynamic typology "anarchic-ideologue" versus "nationalist-separatist" developed in Jerrold M. Post, "Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior," *Terrorism*, v. 7, n. 3, 1984, 241-50; and "Hostilite, Conformite, Fraternite: The Group Dynamics of Terrorist Behavior," *International Journal of Group Psychotherapy*, v. 36, n. 2, April 1986, 211-24. Schmid and Jongman, *Political Terrorism*, 39-59 provide an extensive review of terrorist group typologies.

This thesis uses four sociorevolutionary terrorist groups as case studies to test the theory developed below. The Uruguayan National Liberation Movement (MLN) or Tupamaros was chosen because of its significance as the historical antecedent of this type of terrorist group. The MLN provides a base line against which the remaining case studies are compared. The Canadian Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ) was chosen because of its nature as a hybrid nationalist sociorevolutionary group. The Middle East Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) was chosen in order to consider the influence of sponsorship. The German Red Army Faction (RAF) was chosen in order to consider the impact of multiple generations of terrorists.

This thesis is divided into fifteen sections. Sections one through six develop a theory that explains terrorist group life cycles. Section seven outlines the methodology used to test and analyze the theory. Sections eight through twelve present the case studies and results. Section thirteen considers the influence of the government on the terrorist group life cycle. Section fourteen suggests ways in which this theory might be used to improve counterterrorist policy. Section fifteen offers concluding remarks.

II. THE TERRORIST GROUP - CONSTITUENCY RELATIONSHIP

Several theories imply that terrorist groups rise from social or political movements that are unsuccessful at achieving goals.¹¹ Gurr concludes that terrorist groups reflect, although in distorted form, political beliefs and aspirations of a larger portion of society, and that an understanding of the changing nature of this relationship is necessary for understanding terrorist group development.¹² The key concept of this thesis is that such a relationship exists between the terrorist group and a constituency, the nature of which determines the viability of the terrorist group.

Gurr defines a terrorist group support group as "any social segment - a communal group, faction, political tendency, or class - whose members seek a particular kind of political change."¹³ In the context of this thesis, a terrorist group's constituency is defined

¹¹Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics*, v. 13, n. 4, July 1981, 383-84; Ehud Sprinzak, "The Psychological Formation of Extreme Left Terrorism in a Democracy: The Case of the Weathermen," in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. W. Reich, Woodrow Wilson Center Series, (New York: Cambridge University Press and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1990), 79-83; Hubert M. Blalock, Jr. *Power and Conflict: Toward a General Theory*, Violence, Cooperation, Peace: An International Series (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989), 189; and Gurr, "Terrorism in Democracies," 87..

¹²Gurr, "Terrorism in Democracies," 86.

¹³Ibid., 87.

more strictly as that portion of society that provides the physical, psychological, and political resources necessary for the terrorist group to conduct operations.

Perception plays an important role in this relationship. The constituency, frustrated by inability to achieve their goals, perceives the terrorist group as being their only hope against an intransigent government. The terrorist group, in turn, perceives itself as representing the interests of a larger portion of society, possibly even beyond the constituency. Italian Red Brigadist Adriana Faranda described this perception:

In practice we lived through the thoughts of normal people-or what we thought were the thoughts of normal people...In a sense we were not once but twice removed. We had to trust in our impressions which in fact were only the subjective impressions of others....By having discussions and arguments with the irregular members, we who were clandestine and who had no contact with anything, believed for a while that we understood what the situation was; what people outside thought.¹⁴

Whether a terrorist group is capable of advancing a political agenda and whether they represent any interests but their own is questionable. The point, however, is that the dynamics of the situation foster the perception of this reality in both groups. In this case, perhaps perception becomes reality.

Whether perceived or real, the terrorist group - constituency relationship is one of mutual benefit. Each must provide something the other values in order to perpetuate the

¹⁴Adriana Faranda, Interview in Allison Jamieson, *The Heart Attacked: Terrorism and Conflict in the Italian State*, (New York: Marion Boyars, 1989), 268 and 269. See also Michael Baumann, *Terror or Love? Bommi Baumann's Own Story of His Life as a West German Urban Guerrilla*, Translated by H. Ellenbogen and W. Parker, (New York: Grove Press, 1977), 108.

relationship. As long as the sources of supply remain open the relationship remains strong. The remainder of this section considers the nature of this relationship.

A. TERRORIST GROUP SUPPORT OF THE CONSTITUENCY

Thorton identifies five proximate objectives of terrorism: morale building within the terrorist group and its constituency; advertising the group's existence, goals, and ideals; disorientation of social and political structure; elimination of opposing forces; and provocation of repressive countermeasures.¹⁵ Similarly, the *Narodnaya Volya* (The Will of the People) of late nineteenth century Russia considered the goal of terrorist activity to:

...remove the most important personalities belonging to the administration, to protect the party from spies, to inflict due punishment for official excesses and cruelties. This will have as a general aim the weakening and demoralization of the administration, the demonstration of the possibility of fighting the administration, the strengthening of popular belief in the party's ultimate success, and finally the inculcation of a fighting spirit.¹⁶

Implied in these objectives and goals is the generalization that the terrorist group supports its constituency by influencing the constituency itself and by influencing the government. These two levels of influence are not exclusive, and in most cases reinforce each other.

¹⁵Thomas Perry Thorton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," in *Internal War: Problems and Approaches*, ed., H. Eckstein, (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 82-87.

¹⁶Quoted in David Footman, *Red Prelude: The Life of Russian Terrorist Zhelyabov*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1945), 109. See also Vera Figner, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, (New York: International Publishers, 1927); and Stepniak, *Underground Russia: Revolutionary Profiles and Sketches From Life*, Fourth Edition, (London: Smith, Elder & Company, 1896).

Perhaps the most significant of these influences is the perception that the terrorist group acts as a vanguard that mobilizes the masses in a political and social uprising against the government. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) member Leila Khaled summarized this perception:

We act heroically in a cowardly world to prove that the enemy is not invincible. We act 'violently' in order to blow the wax out of the ears of deaf Western liberals and to remove the straws that block their vision. We act as revolutionaries to inspire the masses and to trigger off the revolutionary upheaval in an era of counter-revolution.¹⁷

Similarly, the *Narodnaya Volya* perceived terrorism as being the only means of "waking up the drowsy empire"¹⁸ and FLQ member Reggie Chartrand saw his group as the "alarm clock of a sleeping people."¹⁹

Related to the perception of the terrorist group as a catalyzing force is the perception that the terrorist group raises the level of awareness concerning the constituency's goals. Since terrorism is largely symbolic, publicity is critical. German 2 June Movement member Michael Baumann explained that "without reporting [of

¹⁷Leila Khaled, *My People Shall Live: The Autobiography of a Revolutionary*, ed. G. Hajjar, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), 126. See also Pierre Vallieres, *White Niggers of America: The Precocious Autobiography of a Quebec "Terrorist"*, Translated by J. Pinkham, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971) and "Revolutionary Strategy and the Role of the Vanguard: Liberation Front of Quebec (FLQ)," in *NLF: National Liberation Fronts, 1960/1970*, eds. D. C. Hodges and R. E. Abu Shanab, (New York: William Morrow, 1972.)

¹⁸Footman, *Red Prelude*, 94.

¹⁹Quoted in Louis Fournier, *F. L. Q.: The Anatomy of an Underground Movement*, trans., E. Baxter, (Toronto: NC Press, 1984), 62.

terrorism] there would be a void. We were built up by the press, after all."²⁰ As the terrorist group makes headlines through violent acts, the government is forced into awareness of the issues that spawned the terrorist group.

In addition, a prolonged terrorist campaign creates the perception of an ineffective and possibly illegitimate government. Such a perception weakens the government's stature, enhances the constituency's, and creates the impression of the terrorist group's ability to catalyze reform. German Revolutionary Cell member Hans Joachim Klein captured the essence of this perception as he describes terrorism as a "pebble in the river bed...But even a pebble can change the course of streams...I was one of those pebbles which, while they didn't shut down the wheels of power, they made them grind up some coarser material."²¹

Finally, the terrorist group is perceived as being a foil for moderate elements within the larger movement. These moderates provide the government with an alternative to the extremism of the terrorist group, creating the possibility of reform in exchange for elimination of the terrorist group. Although this perception may resolve the issues that led to conflict, it would alienate the terrorist group, and presumes a level of control that may not exist.²²

²⁰Michael Baumann, "Michael 'Bommi' Baumann: The Mind of a German Terrorist," Interview by P. Neuhauser, *Encounter*, v. 51, n. 3, September 1978, 83.

²¹Hans Joachim Klein, *Return to Humanity: An Ex-Terrorist's Account*, (Hamburg: Rowolht Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH, 1979), JPRS L/10856, 6 October, 1982, 8.

²²Illustrative of the problems with this perception was the relationship between Begin's Irgun and Ben Gurion's Haganah during the Israeli resistance of British occupied

B. CONSTITUENCY SUPPORT OF THE TERRORIST GROUP

As described by a Tupamaro, constituency support is vital to a terrorist group:

An organizational network will be set up that will surround the central core of the guerrilla force, which will in turn heighten the latter's ties with the social sectors most affected and second, with the people as a whole. At the same time, this network is a link from and to the guerrillas. It provides protection, is the source of supplies, recruitment, and so on. It is obvious that, if the guerrillas have a correct line and if their work is successful, they will enjoy growing support, even considering the fact that not all those who can be soldiers or members of the central nucleus. On the contrary, it is perfectly logical for there to exist different levels of commitment and different possibilities of cooperation. That reality also leads to the need for the network in question and it is absolutely essential to take maximum advantage of the different forms of support available.²³

This passage implies the existence not only of a constituency, but of different levels of constituency.

This thesis divides the constituency into two levels. The passive constituency are those groups and individuals who (1) agree with the terrorist group's goals, but disagree with their means of achieving them; or (2) agree with the goals and means, but are unwilling to get involved; e. g., "freeriders."²⁴ Former Weather Underground member Jane Alpert described such a supporter:

Palestine as described in Menachem Begin, *The Revolt*, Revised Edition, (New York: Dell Publishing, 1978). See also Louis Fournier, *F. L. Q.: The Anatomy of an Underground Movement*, Translated by E. Baxter, (Toronto: NC Press, 1984.) for the problematic relationship between the FLQ and *Parti Quebecois*; and Patrick Seale, *Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire*, (New York: Random House, 1992) for the relationship between the ANO, PLO, and Palestinian diaspora.

²³Tupamaros, *Tupamaro Exploits: An Urban Guerrilla Experience*. (Madrid: Editorial Revolution, 1982.) JPRS-LAM-84-021, 13 February 1984, 83.

²⁴Crenshaw, "Logic of Terrorism," 8.

I think now that Maude was one of many movement sympathizers who lived outwardly conventionally lives but carried out bombings in fantasy and dreamed that someday the United States would produce a genuine revolutionary movement.

and alluded to this level of support when she mused about:

...the extent to which even apolitical young people in the early seventies yearned for social change and were willing to believe that an underground of penniless, scared fugitives had something to do with accomplishing it.²⁵

Such supporters provide the terrorist group with the power of public opinion. In the final analysis, it may be this opinion that constitutes the greatest influence on the government.

In contrast, active constituency agree with the terrorist group's goals and means, and are actively involved, serving as the above ground link between the group and society.

Baumann described this linkage:

Someone who's illegal has to have a helper who can support him. Three people who were illegal would sit in one apartment, and two or three legal ones would take care of them. First of all, if your picture was on television every day, you didn't go out for a week. So you need someone to get stuff for you, who can do everything for you....²⁶

The active constituency, in a sense, provides the terrorist group with a source of social mobility.

In addition to obvious physical support (finance, weapons, ammunition, safehouses, transportation, etc), the active constituency is a critical source of recruitment and

²⁵Jane Alpert, *Growing Up Underground*, (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1981), 240 and 278.

²⁶Baumann, *Terror or Love?*, 66. See also Gehard Muller's comments as quoted in Stefan Aust, *The Baader-Meinhof Group: The Inside Story of a Phenomenon*, trans. A. Bell. (London: The Bodley Head, 1985), 364.

intelligence. Recruitment acts as a physical and ideological regenerative source for the group. Notwithstanding the need to fill out ranks due to attrition, recruitment provides for organizational viability by ensuring the optimism, enthusiasm and innovation necessary for prolonged sustainment.

The constituency is an important source of intelligence, especially during periods when the terrorist group is driven deep underground. Brazilian terrorist and father of urban guerrilla warfare Carlos Marighella noted the constituency's role:

The enemy is observed by the people, but he does not know who among the people transmits information to the urban guerrilla...Information represents an extraordinary potential in the hands of the urban guerrilla...The trustworthy information passed along to the urban guerrilla represents a well-aimed blow....²⁷

Good intelligence is essential to the survival of these small, clandestine groups.

More importantly, both constituency levels provide the terrorist group with the perceived sense legitimacy required for prolonged success. By portraying its violence as morally acceptable and in the service of the constituency's political and social cause, the terrorist group justifies its violence. The constituency, if it does less than condemn, reinforces the perception of the righteousness of the terrorist group's methods, and provides the moral dispensation for its violence. Himes argues that, in such cases, nonlegitimate means acquire a measure of legitimacy as the injustice of the failure of legitimate action is balanced by the apparent justice of nonlegitimate action.

²⁷Carlos Marighella, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, in *Terror and Urban Guerrillas: A Study of Tactics and Documents*, ed. Jay Mallin, (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1971), 88.

In summary, a vital relationship exists between a terrorist group and its constituency. That relationship is based on the perception that the terrorist group is able to influence the government and achieve goals that the constituency cannot. As long as that perception exists, the constituency will continue to provide the terrorist group with the physical, psychological, and political resources necessary to sustain their operations. The problem for the terrorist group occurs when that perception changes.

III. THE NATURE OF TERRORIST GROUP VIOLENCE

Terrorist groups stand out from other political protest groups because their violence.

A terrorist group exists to conduct violent acts, and violent acts determine its existence.

Without violence a terrorist group ceases to be. Baumann explained the relationship between terrorist groups and violence:

At any rate, it was clear to me that revolution is a matter of violence, and at some point you have to start with it, so you prepare yourself for it as early as possible. The tendency was always in that direction: if you're going to do a thing like that, then do it right, take steps in that direction so that one day you can effectively use this violence against the apparatus.²⁸

As a terrorist group uses violence to influence, are there limits beyond which its violence does not influence or in which the influence negatively affects the group? Conceptually such limits exist.

A. THE MINIMUM LEVEL OF VIOLENCE

The minimum level of violence (MLOV) is that level of violence necessary for a terrorist group to (1) maintain itself, and (2) influence its audience. This level is determined by the terrorist group itself. Below the MLOV, terrorist groups are ineffective at achieving either instrumental or organizational goals. Below the MLOV, terrorist group's reason for existence is questioned, fragmentation occurs, and survival is threatened.

²⁸Baumann, *Terror or Love?*, 27

Violence is an accepted aspect of terrorist group membership.²⁹ Knutson notes, however, that before acceptance is reached each terrorist must resolve a moral dilemma associated with violence and the possibility of causing the death of another.³⁰ Bandura argues that terrorists resolve this dilemma by morally disengaging the self-sanction that normally limits the inhumanity of their actions.³¹ Faranda illustrated this process:

I think a person's relationship with violence is, as you say, the most incomprehensible thing. It takes the coming together of so many different elements for one person to go out and kill another. First of all, there is a very high level of abstraction, which serves to project a series of feelings over a whole category of people and over the symbols that represent this category. And in carrying out this mental process of abstraction, you can attribute a series of responsibilities or blames for things on to the category: things which are also concrete facts....Within this attribution of blame and responsibility there is also a burden of passion with which

²⁹Konrad Kellan, "Terrorists--What are They Like? How Some Terrorists Describe Their World and Actions," Rand Note N-1300-SL, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, November 1979), 37; Konrad Kellan, "On Terrorists and Terrorism," Rand Note N-1942-RC, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, December 1982), 22-23; Kent Layne Oots, "An Individual-Level Model of Terrorist Contagion," in *The 1986 Annual on Terrorism*, ed., Y. Alexander, (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 114; Crenshaw, "Organizational Approach," 474-79; and Crenshaw, "Causes of Terrorism," 394;

³⁰Jeanne N. Knutson, "The Terrorists' Dilemmas: Some Implicit Rules of the Game," *Terrorism*, v. 4, 1980, 196.

³¹Albert Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement," in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed., W. Reich. Woodrow Wilson Center Series, (New York: Cambridge University Press and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1990), 161-91. Bandura argues that terrorists achieve this moral disengagement by reconstruing their conduct as serving moral purposes, obscuring personal responsibility, disregarding the injurious consequences of their violence, and blaming or dehumanizing their victims.

one person goes to attack another. But it isn't easy to explain because in part it's a rational mechanism and in part not.³²

Once this moral dilemma is resolved, however, violence becomes an expected and necessary incentive of the terrorist group.

Once violence becomes expected and necessary, terrorist groups must provide that incentive in order to retain its members. Oots asserts that terrorist groups must provide a package of selective incentives in order to attract members.³³ Post argues that individuals are drawn to terrorist groups in order to commit acts of violence,³⁴ so that for many violence becomes a dominant incentive. A terrorist group that is unable to achieve that minimum level of violence loses the utility of that incentive.

Post argues that a terrorist group must commit acts of terrorism in order to justify its existence.³⁵ Since, a terrorist group exists to conduct violent acts, if it is not conducting violent acts, then it ceases to exist. A terrorist group, consequently, must achieve a minimum level of violence to maintain the group.

³²Faranda, Interview in Jamieson, *The Heart Attacked*, 271.

³³Oots, "Organizational Perspectives," 143.

³⁴Jerrold M. Post, "Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces," in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed., W. Reich, Woodrow Wilson Center Series, (New York: Cambridge University Press and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1990), 25; and Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism," in *Political Psychology*, ed., M. G. Hermann, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1986), 386-89, offer supporting and competing arguments.

³⁵Post, "Group and Organisational Dynamics," 312.

In addition, a minimum level of violence is required for the terrorist group to achieve the publicity necessary to influence its audience. A terrorist group supports its constituency by influencing the constituency itself and by influencing the government. Although this support may be only a perception, a minimum level of violence is a necessary condition for propagation of that perception, and, consequently, maintenance of influence. Knutson argues that below the minimum level the terrorist group risks being ignored by the media and being ignored by the government as a political actor.³⁶ An ignored terrorist group does not influence.

The MLOV is not a static concept, but is part of the dynamic process that determines a terrorist group's life cycle. As a terrorist group's actual violence increases, the MLOV tends to increase as well, although at a much slower rate. This upward creep occurs as a result of a process in which the violence becomes routinized. Routinization occurs as the terrorist group's violence becomes habitual at a particular level, resulting in the violence's loss of effectiveness as an incentive and loss of influence at that level. In order to overcome the routinization process, the violence must increase over time to achieve the same effect.

As determined by terrorist group organizational motives, the MLOV moves upward with the terrorist group's actual violence. Once their violence declines, however, the terrorist group reaches the MLOV at a higher level than in earlier phases of the life cycle. For reasons discussed above, if the violence moves below the MLOV, organizational

³⁶Knutson, "The Terrorists' Dilemmas," 206.

decline occurs. The terrorist group's survival, consequently, is threatened at a higher level of violence than that which determined its earlier existence.

In summary, terrorist groups must exceed the MLOV in order to be effective. Below the MLOV, the terrorist group fragments, their influence wanes, constituency support is withdrawn, and membership dries up. Below the MLOV, terrorist group legitimacy is questioned and survival is threatened. In order to survive, the terrorist group continually must increase its violence. Unfortunately, for the terrorist group, an upper limit to its violence exists as well.

B. THE ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE

Discussion of terrorism and socially acceptable levels of violence typically focusses on society in general. Thorton defines terrorism as "a symbolic act designed to influence political behavior by extranormal means, entailing the threat or use of violence."³⁷ One aspect of this definition is that terrorism exceeds the norms of violent political protest that are accepted by a particular society. This extranormality separates terrorism from other forms of political violence, and varies between societies and across time.

Hutchinson lists one of the essential properties of terrorism as its manifestation in socially and politically unacceptable acts of violence.³⁸ She argues further that tolerance

³⁷Thorton, "Terror as a Weapon," 73-78.

³⁸Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, "The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, v. 16, n. 3, September 1972, 385.

is influenced by the duration, magnitude, predictability of the terrorism.³⁹ Society is most tolerant of "sustained intense relentless" campaigns of terrorism which "numb" the audience, and of terrorism that remains on the boundary between the extremes of predictability.

Knutson notes that an upper limit of acceptable terrorist violence and is determined by a sympathetic public base.⁴⁰ This public base sets that upper limit by unconsciously searching for an acceptable rationale for the terrorism, coupled with the need to redress "historic wrongs."⁴¹ She argues, consequently, that the terrorist group must address itself to that acceptable limit, as violence that exceeds that limit negatively affects the public base. She argues that violence in excess of the acceptable level forces the government into retaliation "in the certain knowledge that the public will support any effort to alleviate the anxiety which is posed by the threatened action."⁴² Implied in this argument is the idea that support of the terrorist group is withdrawn or withheld when its violence exceeds the acceptable limit.

This thesis focuses on the acceptable level of violence that is determined by the terrorist group's constituency, and not by society writ large. The constituency provides the terrorist group with the physical, psychological, and political resources necessary for

³⁹Ibid., 389.

⁴⁰Knutson, "Terrorists' Dilemmas," 206-11.

⁴¹Ibid., 210.

⁴²Ibid., 206.

their operations. The difference between society and the constituency lies within the latter's ability to proffer and withhold or withdraw support. The issue is concerned with the level of violence at which this support withdrawn. For this thesis, the acceptable level of violence (ALOV) is defined as that level at which the rate of change of violence, either qualitatively or quantitatively, exceeds the terrorist group's constituency's ability to adapt to the violence. The constituency reaches a violence saturation point, a function of accumulation and intensity, beyond which more violence is unacceptable and support is withheld or withdrawn.

As with the MLOV, the ALOV is not a static concept. The effect of increasing actual violence, however, is more subtle. The ALOV is determined by constituency's perception of its relationship with the terrorist group. On one side of that relationship, the constituency perceives the terrorist group's actual violence as increasing because of strategic motives. With this perception, the constituency is able to adapt to and accept the increasing actual violence, as the terrorist group is perceived as moving the constituency toward its goals. The terrorist group remains the legitimate means of achieving those goals. By providing for a steady increase in ALOV, this constitutes the best case for the terrorist group.

On the other side of the relationship, the terrorist group's actual violence increases in response to organizational motives. In this case, the terrorist group's violence becomes end as well as means. The constituency is unable to adapt to and accept the increasing violence, as it is perceived as being detrimental to the constituency's goals. By creating

an ALOV that turns into an inflexible barrier. this constitutes the worst case for the terrorist group.

In summary, the terrorist group's constituency determines the acceptable level of violence. Above the ALOV, the constituency questions the terrorist group's legitimacy and withdraws support. The terrorist group's survival is threatened. The terrorist group's problem, as will be argued, is that it cannot prevent its actual violence from increasing beyond the ALOV.

IV. THE TERRORIST GROUP'S ACTUAL VIOLENCE

The terrorist group's reality occurs somewhere between the two sides of the relationship with its constituency. A terrorist group begins life focussed on strategic goals. This focus provides for an increasing ALOV, as the terrorist group's violence remains consistent with the constituency's objectives. This blissful state, however, is only temporary. As will be discussed in this section, internal tensions, compounded by external pressures, cause the terrorist group's violence to increase at a faster rate than the ALOV. As this occurs, the terrorist group's goals begin to shift from instrumental to organizational.

A. EXTERNAL PRESSURES ON TERRORIST GROUP VIOLENCE

Heyman argues that contagion and cooperation can account for the spreading of terrorism.⁴³ Contagion applies pressures to terrorist groups that result in increasing violence. Since terrorism requires publicity in order to influence, this process is based on the assumption that as one type of terrorism proves to be effective for one group or in one country, it often spreads to others.⁴⁴

⁴³Edward S. Heyman, "The Diffusion of Transnational Terrorism," in *Responding to the Terrorist Threat: Security and Crisis Management*, ed. R. H. Shultz and S. Sloan (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), 201.

⁴⁴Manus I. Midlarsky, Martha Crenshaw, and Fumihiko Yoshida, "Why Terrorism Spreads: The Contagion of International Terrorism," *International Studies Quarterly*, v. 24, n. 2, June 1980, 262-98, develop a hierarchical theory in which larger, more visible, and more respected terrorist groups operating in higher profile nations are imitated by less highly ranked groups.

A terrorist group, logically, imitates only those tactics and techniques that improve on its current methods. A Tupamaro described this process:

In the ranks of revolutionaries, there very often exists a spontaneous tendency toward imitation, especially in our country, where for many years we have lived with our windows open to the outside, attentive, in different spheres of human activity, to anything happening abroad and ready to adopt it or value it highly...It is naturally especially tempting for revolutionaries to copy victorious experiences and try to imitate them.⁴⁵

As Oots observes, the media acts as a terrorist group learning tool.⁴⁶ The new and improved, the bigger and better is imitated.

Cooperation between terrorist groups, occurs as tactics, techniques, and procedures are shared through information exchange, common training, resource sharing, and combined operations.⁴⁷ Cooperation does not imply the existence of an international

⁴⁵Tupamaros, *Tupamaro Exploits*, 15.

⁴⁶Oots, "Individual Level Model," 115.

⁴⁷Carlos Marighella, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, in *Terror and Urban Guerrillas: A Study of Tactics and Documents*, ed. J. Mallin, (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1971), 67-115, is perhaps the best example of information exchange. Aust, *Baader-Meinhof Group*, 89-101; and Julian Becker, *Hitler's Children: The Story of the Baader-Meinhof Terrorist Gang*, (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1977), 179-80, describe "urban guerrilla" training received by RAF members at a PFLP camp in Jordan. Gustave Morf, *Terror in Quebec: Case Studies of the FLQ*, (Vancouver: Clarke, Irwin & Company, 1970), 77-79; Fournier, *F. L. Q.*, 75-6 and 157; and Alpert, *Growing Up Underground*, 165-71, describe resource sharing between the FLQ and US radical groups. Hans Joachim Klein, "I Believed in It With Blind Rage," Interview by Hamburg *Der Spiegel*, 7 August 1978, JPRS L/10670, 19 July 1982, 33-44; "Memoirs of an International Terrorist: Conversations with Hans Joachim Klein." Interview by J. M. Bougereau, *Paris Liberation*, 1978, in *The German Guerrilla: Terror, Reaction, and Resistance*, Translated by P. Silcock. (Minneapolis: Soil of Liberty, 1981), 23-30; and *Return to Humanity*, 20-67 describes a combined German Revolutionary Cell and Palestinian PFLP operation that was led by the international terrorist "Carlos." Urbano.

terrorist network. but does imply some level of interaction between specific groups. Contagion and cooperation provide for quantitative or qualitative improvement in the methods of the receiving terrorist group. Tactics, techniques, and procedures are imitated or shared. Resources are supplied. Efforts are combined. The receiving terrorist group is able, as a result, to increase the actual violence within the framework of its terrorist campaign.

In addition, competition between terrorist groups increases actual violence. As publicity is critical to a terrorist group's influence, the deciding factor for a proposed operation is often the headlines that might be achieved. Baumann explained, "for instance, we sat down and pondered what would be a story that nobody could miss, that everyone would have to talk about and everyone would have to report...."⁴⁸ Similarly, FLQ leader Charles Gagnon justified violence on publicity value, noting that press releases were ignored, while bombings received front-page headlines which, in turn, helped the constituency "to identify the enemy."⁴⁹

Terrorist groups, consequently, compete for media attention, resources, and constituencies. This competition tends to influence each group's actual violence. In order to retain the media's and the public's attention, a terrorist group continually must raise

"Interview with Urbano," in *Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America*, eds. J. Kohl and J. Litt, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1974), 266-67, describes the need to maintain the utility of diplomatic kidnapping for use by all terrorist groups.

⁴⁸Baumann, *Terror or Love?*, 32.

⁴⁹Quoted in Morf, *Terror in Quebec*, 158.

the ante. Actions must be more violent, be something new, and be against targets which have greater influence than the competitors'. Baumann explained that "of course, the arson was a matter of competition, too; an attempt to claim a vanguard position through practice...Whoever does the heaviest action determines the direction."⁵⁰ Whoever determines the direction gets the support.

In summary, terrorist groups influence each other through processes of contagion, cooperation, and competition. These processes result in decisions that increase the terrorist group's actual violence. These processes, in turn, compound the internal tensions discussed in the next section.

B. INTERNAL TENSIONS AND TERRORIST GROUP VIOLENCE

Internal tensions result in increasing terrorist group actual violence. Crenshaw notes that *terrorist groups differ from other political groups in that their existence is violent, extralegal, and underground.*⁵¹ As a consequence of this existence, terrorist groups are in continuous conflict with the external world. In order to survive in a world in which everyone is an enemy, the group must focus its trust inward in order to focus its actions outward. The result of this internalization is intense tension within the group, a tension that can be relieved only by violence.

⁵⁰Baumann, "Mind of a German Terrorist," 83.

⁵¹Crenshaw, "Organizational Approach," 466.

Post argues that internal dynamics are the major determinant of terrorist group action.⁵² According to one Italian terrorist, the "sense of the group has always been very strong. It determined personal choice and concrete behavior toward society."⁵³ At times, however, the group is overwhelming. German RAF member Volker Speitel believed that:

The identity or identification with the group is like an alarm clock that always rings on 'I keep going' in this choice you always make when, with a residual spark of self-preservation, you ask yourself 'why'...you cannot cut the thick threads the group has covered you with in the course of time. One's whole existence was first of all in the group...the whole existence of all of us was first of all the group.⁵⁴

The "group" is a powerful factor in terrorist group behavior. Is that behavior, however, a function of an internal dynamic that is cohesive or tension-ridden?

Terrorist groups exist in continuous conflict with the external world. Crenshaw and Post conclude that the internal cohesion of terrorist groups is increased by underground life and external danger.⁵⁵ Baumann supported this assessment when he stated that, "the greater the pressure from outside, the more you stick together, the more mistakes you

⁵²Post, "Group and Organisational Dynamics," 312.

⁵³Donatella della Porta, "Political Socialization in Left-Wing Underground Organizations: Biographies of Italian and German Militants," *International Social Movement Research*, v. 4, ed. D. della Porta, (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1992), 266.

⁵⁴Ibid., 276.

⁵⁵Jerrold M. Post, "Rewarding Fire With Fire? Effects of Retaliation on Terrorist Group Dynamics," in *Contemporary Trends in World Terrorism*, ed. A. Kurz, The Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, (New York: Praeger, 1987.), 113; and Crenshaw, "Decisions to Use Terrorism", 32. Arthur A. Stein, "Conflict and Cohesion: A Review of the Literature," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, v. 20, n. 1, March 1976, 143-72, provides a thorough review of the theory that external conflict increases the internal cohesion of groups.

make, the more pressure is turned inward...."⁵⁶ Later when asked whether a terrorist group can be held together from inside, his reply was, "no, only from the outside. One's own will is practically completely eliminated, only the group will prevail."⁵⁷

This assessment, however, is externally oriented and ignores the real tensions that result as the group is forced to focus inward. Speitel asserted that external dangers actually exacerbate the tensions in a terrorist group:

Of course, the pressure of permanent persecution influences the group. All the relationships of all the people in the group are eclipsed by this pressure, which finally becomes the only connecting link holding the group together. They call it the 'dialectics of persecution' and believe that it strengthens the unity of the group...But, in reality an extreme tension develops, which erupts in quarrels, the forming of cliques, and sneering remarks to one another.⁵⁸

"Cohesive" may not be the best description of the internal workings of a terrorist group.

Although a terrorist group provides an appearance of solidarity to the external world, its internal situation is a far different matter. Internally, a terrorist group is a "pressure cooker,"⁵⁹ constantly on the edge of boiling over from the tension. These tensions result from problems related to structure and process, individual issues, and group

⁵⁶Baumann, *Terror or Love?*, 108.

⁵⁷Baumann, "Mind of a German Terrorist," 86.

⁵⁸Quoted in Klaus Wasmund, "The Political Socialization of Terrorist Groups in West Germany," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, v. 11, n. 2, Fall 1983, 236. See also Giorgio (pseud.), "Memoirs From the Underground," Milan, *IT Il Pane E Le Rose*, November 1981, JPRS L/10618, 28 June 1982, 86-7.

⁵⁹Post, "Group and Organisational Dynamics," 312.

dynamics. The remainder of this section considers the influence of these types of tensions on terrorist group actual violence.

1. Structure and Process as a Source of Tension

Significant to this thesis is a structure and process dilemma associated with group control and security requirements. Zawodny and Bell argue that underground operations, as a price for secrecy and security, are inherently inefficient.⁶⁰ Bell concludes that "as a general rule, the greater the secrecy, the greater the inefficiency of the organization or operation; absolute secrecy assures absolute chaos."⁶¹ Terrorist groups typically make security or compartmentalization their top priority. According to Patty Hearst, "security was our watchword twenty-four hours a day, every day."⁶²

In such a situation, basic group processes become time and resource demanding. Important messages go awry or are intercepted; deadlines and meetings are missed; instructions are unclear; operations are spoiled. Klein found that clandestinity:

...takes up 80% of your time. You can't afford to let your guard slip for a minute. You have to encode, decode, and recode addresses and messages. What's more the

⁶⁰Zawodny, "Internal Organizational Problems, 277-85; J. Bowyer Bell, "Aspects of the Dragonworld: Covert Communications and the Rebel Ecosystem," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, v. 3, n. 1, 1990, 15-43; and "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiency of the Underground," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, v. 2, n. 2, Summer 1990, 194-211. See also Jacek Szmata, "The Relation Between Group Structure and Intra-Group Tensions and Conflict," *International Journal of Group Tensions*, v. 20, n. 1, 1990.

⁶¹Bell, "Revolutionary Dynamics," 203.

⁶²Patricia Campbell Hearst with Alvin Moscow, *Every Secret Thing*, (New York: Doubleday, 1982), 196.

codes change: you have to keep all that in your head. I can't go into detail about that. All I can say is that it's an insane waste of time. Arranging a meeting is a whole rigmarole. Not to mention all the security measures you have to take to eliminate any possibility of being followed. You get into habits. I noticed that when we were in one of our hideouts we had a tendency to talk in whispers, even when there wasn't the slightest risk that we would be overheard.⁶³

Such an environment is characterized by frustration, disillusionment, and tension.

Zawodny concludes that these tensions, if not released, disrupt the group and serve as "catalysts of violence."⁶⁴

2. Individual Needs as Source of Tension

The needs of individual terrorists also produce tensions within the group. Each terrorist faces a moral dilemma concerning their readiness to conduct violent acts. Resolution of this dilemma creates tensions in the individual which ultimately are transferred to the group. Faranda described this tension:

Some things we only understood afterwards: That violence can actually make you unclean too: that violence only leads to violence-it's not true that violence can purify anything; that hatred gives birth to hatred; that every time you use violence you diminish yourself. At the same time you are partly aware of this internal contradiction but feel it as something inevitable, something which you don't like, but which you perforce must do, the price to pay, to your own detriment in human terms.⁶⁵

⁶³Klein, "Memoirs of International Terrorist", 47

⁶⁴Zawodny, "Internal Organizational Problems," 277-85.

⁶⁵Faranda, Interview in Jamieson, *The Heart Attacked*, 272.

In addition, life underground often is mundane, punctuated only by sporadic action. Daily problems, although amplified, often were unresolvable because of the illegal situation. Italian Red Brigadist Patrizio Peci described these problems:

People imagine the life of a brigadist to be all violence, mystery and adventure. It's anything but that. Moments like those are extremely rare, an infinitesimal part, as compared to the others. The remainder is made up of everyday problems, of trivialities with no name. Problems of the heart, of sex, of house, of money, of vacations, of family affections. Above all they are psychological problems because all the others are aggravated by the fact that one is cut off from the world: as a matter of fact, one is against the world and the 'Cause' does not always--indeed never--takes one's mind off one's problems or to settle a quarrel with your girlfriend, if you are lucky to have one.⁶⁶

Similarly, Andreas Baader asserted that this situation, although extremely difficult, allowed little room for sympathy:

Anyone who's in this group just has to be tough. Has to be able to take things. If you're not tough enough then you've no business here. Our aggression gets bottled up, with the pressures of living outside the law-it has to come out, we can't take it out on the outside world just because we're living underground, so we have to take it out on the group, and then of course we fight; we have to be able to handle that, we have to be tough enough for that.⁶⁷

Problems and concerns of individual terrorists are not eliminated by the underground. Instead they become exaggerated until, Faranda noted, "you had the feeling of squeezing yourself into an ever-tighter corner."⁶⁸ This feeling creates individual tensions that rapidly become part of the group dynamic. The terrorist group, however,

⁶⁶Patrizio Peci with G. B. Guerri and A. Mondadori, *I, The Contemptible One*, (Milan, IT: Editore S. P. A., 1983), JPRS-TOT-85-016-L, 20 March 1985, 50.

⁶⁷Aust, *Baader-Meinhof Group*, 132.

⁶⁸Faranda, Interview in Jamieson, *The Heart Attacked*, 270.

attempts to manage these tensions by placing intense demands for conformity on the individual.

3. Group Dynamics as Sources of Tension

Terrorist groups exist under great stress, a product of the external and internal situation. Any discord disrupts group effectiveness. Post and Crenshaw, consequently, argue that extreme pressures for conformity exist within terrorist groups.⁶⁹ Faranda described these pressures:

When you get involved in a long term project which absorbs you totally, then you have to accept certain rules. You accept for example that when there are political disagreements you follow the majority line. You support the others. It's a kind of pact of obedience. Even when you don't agree you have to follow things through, bring them to completion. And also, when you live clandestinely you are continually surrounded by doubts. You live in an unreal situation...I might feel my ideas were only my own conviction and didn't correspond to reality. A terrible personal insecurity grows up, so you say, 'Let's wait a minute. Perhaps it's me that's wrong, let's wait a bit and have some other proof.' So before breaking off a relationship with people with which whom you have shared literally everything, before reaching conclusions and making judgements about these people, you think very carefully.⁷⁰

Conformity to group norms, consequently, is a source of intense tension within a terrorist group.

These tensions created by conformity are generated by the members against themselves, by the followers against the leader, and by the group against the members. Self-imposed conformity fulfills the individual's need to belong and ensures that the

⁶⁹Post, "Group and Organisational Dynamics," 310; Crenshaw, *Psychology of Political Terrorism*, 396 and "Decisions to Use Terrorism," 32.

⁷⁰Faranda, Interview in Jamieson, *The Heavens Attacked*, 281.

individual remains a member of the group. Group conformity ensures survival by rewarding compliance and punishing deviance. Conformity directed against the leader ensures that he remains linked to group norms, values, and goals. The Tupamaros believed that "the most important thing is to create in him a feeling of dependence on the group. He has to be aware of the fact that he cannot be self sufficient-that others are essential to him."⁷¹ Nobody is immune.

Conformity creates tensions by stifling the group's ability to innovate and change. Crenshaw views innovation as necessary to terrorist groups because it creates a possibility of surprise.⁷² Peci felt that "in the great majority of the cases, our strong point was the element of surprise, the fact that the target did not know he was the target."⁷³ Since terrorist groups are weak relative to the government, surprise is essential to success. Change is necessary in response to lack of success. In the face of failure, a terrorist group must either change or risk destruction. Both situations create tension by limiting the terrorist group's flexibility. In addition, the methods that terrorist groups use to ensure conformity create levels of tension. With the most obvious method, non-conformists simply disappear. Baumann found that the "group principle is that there's no entrance fee, but quitting is impossible. That is made clear to every new member-the only

⁷¹Tupamaros, *Tupamaro Exploits*, 137.

⁷²Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism," 15.

⁷³Peci, *I, The Contemptible One*, 79

way out is via the cemetery."⁷⁴ RAF member Brigitte Mohnhaupt described a less extreme method applied to alleged informer Edelgard G.: "I mean, she informed on people, informed on apartments. What happened, what was done-well, she got a bucket of tar in the kisser and a notice hung around her neck."⁷⁵ Such action creates tension in the remaining members unless limited to only the most extreme cases.

With a second method, the *criticism self-criticism* process, the group ensures conformity by flooding members with ideology, criticizing them, and allowing self-criticism. Peci noted in "this way he who had made a mistake, by being criticized before the entire column, suffered very much, there was no need for any other punishment and he was careful not to repeat it."⁷⁶ The member is forced through extremely tense phases of dissonance, belligerence, and finally repentance.⁷⁷

The repentant recruit, although now a conforming member, gained that membership through a process that forced the member to bury individual needs well below the group's. Hearst observed that "by the time they had finished with me I was,

⁷⁴Baumann, "Mind of a German Terrorist," 86.

⁷⁵Quoted in Aust, *Baader-Meinhof Group*, 172.

⁷⁶Peci, I, *The Contemptible One*, 88.

⁷⁷This extreme tension is described by Hearst, *Every Secret Thing*, 142; Larry Grathwohl with Frank Regan, *Bringing Down America: An FBI Informer With the Weathermen*. (New York: Arlington House, 1976), 119-22 and 149-50; Susan Stern, *With the Weathermen: The Personal Journal of a Revolutionary Woman*, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1975); and Seale, *Abu Nidal*, 3-32.

in fact, a soldier in the Symbionese Liberation Army."⁷⁸ When she was finally arrested and queried by the police as to her occupation, her reply was, "urban guerrilla."⁷⁹ Similarly, ANO member Nidal Muhammad noted that after six months of grueling physical training and indoctrination, "we were brainwashed at the end."⁸⁰ In both cases, their individual identities were discarded for a portion of their group's identity.

Post asserts internal dissent, as it questions the terrorist group's legitimacy, is extremely disturbing.⁸¹ RAF member Peter Boock described pressures "that can lead to things you can't imagine...the fear of what is happening to one when you say, for example, 'No, I won't do that, and for these and these reasons.' What the consequences of that can be."⁸² Crenshaw argues, consequently, that terrorist groups, extremely intolerant of internal dissent, consider it to be a more serious threat than fragmentation.⁸³ Intense tensions exist within the group as dissent is expressed. Terrorist groups instead promote fragmentation to resolve internal conflict.

⁷⁸Ibid., 206.

⁷⁹Ibid., 365.

⁸⁰Quoted in Rod Norland and Ray Wilkinson, "Inside Terror, Inc.," *Newsweek*, 7 April 1986, 27.

⁸¹Post, "Rewarding Fire With Fire," 107.

⁸²Quoted in Post, "Group and Organizational Dynamics," 310.

⁸³Crenshaw, "Organizational Approach," 483. For the roots of this argument see Albert O. Hirshman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline, in Firms, Organizations, and States*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.)

4. Violence, Decision Making, and Tension Management

The result of the above tensions is a decision making environment in which organizational motives quickly take precedence over instrumental ones, and consequently, influence the terrorist group's decision making. Knutson finds "groupthink" to be a powerful process that shapes terrorist group decisions, as illustrated by one of her interviews with a political terrorist:

...then you tend to cut off contacts from the outside and there emerges a group personality almost that's uh separate from every, all the individuals and develops this own little internal momentum and just-phew-really deadly.... I think that's a ...an unhealthy development, an unhealthy phenomena, unhealthy in that...you find your better judgement being subsumed in this, in this emerging uh...personality. Uh, uh, find yourself... doing things, which maybe you wouldn't have done, or maybe you would have done real differently. But doing them because uh...because it seems to be the direction the group is going. It seems to be [inevitable.]⁸⁴

She concludes that this process is one of enforced conformity and narrowing breadth which limits the terrorist group's objectivity.

⁸⁴Knutson, *The Terrorists' Dilemmas*, 211-215. Knutson's conclusions are based on a series of interviews with 60 political terrorists conducted between 1979 and 1982. For discussion of the effects of conformity on group decision making see Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*. Reprint, Second Edition. (Atlanta, GA: Cherokee Publishing, 1982.); Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, Translated and edited by J. Strachey. The Standard Edition, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1959); Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascos*, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1972.); Glen Whyte, "Groupthink Reconsidered," *Academy of Management Review*, v. 14, n. 1, 1989, 40-56; and Michael B. Elmes and Gary Gemmill, "The Psychodynamics of Mindlessness and Dissent in Small Groups," *Small Group Research*, v. 21, n. 1, February 1990, 28-44.

Crenshaw argues further that such behavior creates a "risky shift," and encourages increased violence.⁸⁵ This risky shift coupled with the inherent tensions of the terrorist group fosters an environment in which violence becomes a method of tension management. Baumann observed that a "lot of aggression got released in a totally irrational action... You have to see that people can be driven so far that they can only free themselves by irrational aggressive actions."⁸⁶ Speitel described a similar use for violence, in that the "fear and insecurity everybody had became a kind of group syndrome. And, as a means of mastering this, blind action was proposed."⁸⁷

The critical problem with using violence to manage tensions arises as violence becomes routinized. Horowitz argues that this process causes extraordinary and unusual phenomena to become normal, everyday events.⁸⁸ As the terrorist group's violence becomes routine, the public habituates and loses interest, headlines are missed, and influence wanes. The legitimacy of the terrorist group and their use of violence is questioned, both internally and by their constituency. At this point, the violence must be

⁸⁵Crenshaw, "Psychology of Political Terrorism," 397. See also Paul t'Hart, "Groupthink, Risk-Taking and Recklessness: Quality of Process and Outcome in Policy Decision Making," *Politics and the Individual*, v. 1, n. 1, 1991, 67-90.

⁸⁶Baumann, *Terror or Love?*, 30-31.

⁸⁷Quoted in Wasmund, "Political Socialization," 236.

⁸⁸Irving L. Horowitz, "The Routinization of Terrorism and Its Unanticipated Consequences," in *Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence*, ed., M. Crenshaw, (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1983), 39.

increased in order for the terrorist group to regain its perception of legitimacy, and, consequently, regain its influence.

The consequences of this routinization process are significant to the terrorist group's continued viability. The terrorist group requires ever higher levels of violence to manage the tensions within the group, as well as to maintain influence. In order to maintain both factors at a constant level, the terrorist group's actual violence must increase at an increasing rate. Violence begets more violence as the terrorist group is forced continuously into finding bigger and better means.

The result is actual violence that spirals rapidly beyond the terrorist group's ability to achieve both instrumental and organizational goals. Baumann described this problem when asked whether operations such as the Schleyer kidnapping led forward politically. He replied, "No backward. But the people who have got as far as that are in a spiral; they act according to laws that they've long since lost the power to lay down themselves...it shows how things get out of one's control. That's what I mean by the spiral one gets into."⁸⁹ The terrorist group is forced to choose between its own survival and the needs of its constituency.

Crenshaw, consequently, observes that once a terrorist group embarks on a campaign of violence, psychological forces make it very difficult to halt as the "process

⁸⁹Baumann, "Mind of a German Terrorist," 81 and 83. Similarly, Klein "Memoirs of International Terrorist," 44/50, believed that the "relation between the ends and the means employed becomes insane," consequently, "these actions have their own dynamic. They become reified...It's a vicious circle. From one action to the next, things have got dirtier and dirtier, more and more apolitical...."

gathers its own momentum, independent of external events."⁹⁰ Baumann described this process:

This crazy concentration, all day long, those are the things that come together horribly at the end, when there's no more sensibility in the group. Only rigid continuation, total pressure to achieve, and it keeps going, always gets worse....There's only this possibility at the end, that's what makes the thing so heavy, and that's where failure lies.⁹¹

Wasmund concludes that for terrorist groups "there is no way back, there remains only the sense of escape forward, or in other words escalation to bigger and bigger terrorist operations."⁹²

Once the terrorist group gets to the point at which its only escape is forward, their battle is lost. Organizational behavior takes precedence over instrumental behavior: its survival over the needs of the constituency. The terrorist group's violence becomes ends rather than means, and spirals beyond the acceptable level. The constituency's

⁹⁰Crenshaw, "Causes of Terrorism," 396. For discussion of decision making problems that perpetuate the violence see Irving L. Janis, *Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management* (New York: Free Press, 1989); Barry M. Staw, "Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action," *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*, v. 16, 1976; and Barry M. Staw and Jerry Ross, "Behavior in Escalation Situations: Antecedents, Prototypes, and Solutions," *Research in Organizational Behavior*, v. 9, (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1987).

⁹¹Baumann, *Terror or Love?*, 109. Klein, "Memoirs of International Terrorist," 43, supports this assessment: "It's my feeling that if you stay with the guerrillas for a long time, then sooner or later you throw lots of things overboard. Everything from your humanity to your political ideals. You sink deeper and deeper into the shit. Once you start out along that road, the only way to go is straight ahead. You can't escape anymore."

⁹²Wasmund, "Political Socialization," 237.

support is withdrawn, precipitating a decline in the terrorist group's violence. As its violence declines below the minimum level, organizational decline occurs and the group ceases to be.

In summary, terrorist groups face a Catch-22. They must be violent in order to manage the inherent tension within the group. As the actual violence increases in order to maintain the group, the relationship with the terrorist group's constituency is threatened. This threat, in turn, threatens the terrorist group's survival. Terrorist groups, consequently, contain the seeds of self-destruction within the group. Whether realized or not, terrorist group decisions reflect this fact, and in so doing, determine the evolution of the group's life cycle.

V. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONCEPTS

The above concepts are the building blocks upon which the theory is based. This section presents a series of hypotheses that relate the concepts to each other.

1. Hypothesis 1

If external pressures and internal tensions are present, then terrorist group actual violence increases. Terrorist groups do not exist in vacuums. External pressures between terrorist groups influence each through processes of contagion, competition, and cooperation. Internal tensions exist as products of security, individual need, and group dynamics. Both external pressures and internal tensions cause increases in terrorist group actual violence.

2. Hypothesis 2

If terrorist group actual violence increases, then MLOV creeps upward as well. Terrorist group violence becomes routinized over time. The violence required to maintain the group and achieve its influence at a constant level, must increase at an increasing rate. The minimum level required to ensure maintenance and influence increases as well.

3. Hypothesis 3

If terrorist group actual violence increases beyond ALOV, then constituency support is withdrawn. The ALOV is determined by the constituency's perception of the

terrorist group's ability to achieve their goals. When the constituency perceives the terrorist group's violence as no longer representing the constituency's needs then that support is withdrawn.

4. Hypothesis 4

If constituency support is withdrawn, then terrorist group actual violence declines. The terrorist group relies on physical (finance, recruits, transportation, intelligence, etc.), psychological, and political support from their constituency to conduct their operations. In the absence of this support, the terrorist group's capabilities decline and their influence wanes.

5. Hypothesis 5

If terrorist group actual violence declines below MLOV, then they will not survive. Below the MLOV, a terrorist group is not achieving the actual violence necessary to maintain the group, and for the group to influence their audience. Below the MLOV, fragmentation occurs, membership drops, and the terrorist group is ignored.

VI. A TERRORIST GROUP'S LIFE CYCLE

The above concepts and relationships are not static, but are building blocks in a dynamic process that determines the evolution of a terrorist group's life cycle. As discussed above, terrorist groups form from larger political or social movements that are unsuccessful at achieving their goals. This thesis takes a terrorist group from that point of formation and divides their life cycle into five phases: preparation, growth, limitation, decline, and extinction or regeneration.

In Figure 1, terrorist groups are characterized in terms of the concepts outlined above. A terrorist group, ideally, maintains its AV between the MLOV and ALOV. This ideal condition is realized during the preparation




Figure 1. Terrorist Group Preparation Phase.

phase of the terrorist group's life cycle. During this phase, the terrorist group is most concerned with organizational development and support consolidation, while strategic goals are being defined. Actual violence is minimized, with actions designed to gain

experience and procure resources in preparation for a full-scale campaign. Cooperation, especially information exchange and training assistance, is the most significant external influence.

As represented in Figure 2, the terrorist group's AV must begin to increase in order to achieve its strategic goals. This increase marks the beginning of the growth phase and is primarily a




Figure 2. Terrorist Group Growth Phase.

function of conscious decision to achieve qualitative and quantitative improvement in the group's violence. This improvement is necessary to establish and maintain the terrorist group's influence. The MLOV begins to creep upward as well, but at a much lower rate than the AV. Early in the growth phase, the terrorist group, with an established infrastructure and defined constituency, embarks on a campaign to achieve their strategic goals. By virtue of their increasing AV, the terrorist group is conducting an effective and successful campaign. The terrorist group is organizationally optimistic; internal tensions are limited. The terrorist group's behavior is determined almost exclusively by its strategic goals. Contagion, cooperation, and competition are equally significant influences on the increasing AV.

The terrorist group's response to this success is an increasing rate of its AV, with success demanding more success and increasing violence more violence. Internal tensions play an increasingly significant role, a product of the underground environment and the decision making demands on the group. The violence takes on a life of its own, accelerating rapidly upward.

As represented in Figure 3, this acceleration of the terrorist group's AV rapidly reduces its room for maneuver and margin for error. The terrorist group becomes limited on one side by the upward creep of the MLOV. On




Figure 3. Acceleration of Terrorist Group AV.

the other, the terrorist group is constrained by an increasingly inflexible ALOV, as the constituency begins to question the terrorist group's motives. Internal tensions and external pressures, however, cause AV to continue increasing. As the AV exceeds the ALOV, the terrorist group's relationship with its constituency wears thin and its support is withheld. Organizational motives take precedence over instrumental ones as the primary determinant of the terrorist group's behavior. Contagion, cooperation, and competition persist as significant influences on their AV.

The point at which AV and ALOV intersect is a point of no return, marking the beginning of the terrorist group's decline. Beyond this point its AV spirals upward, further exacerbating the difficulty of decision making. External pressures and internal tensions continue to reinforce the spiralling AV. The terrorist group's relationship with its constituency is disrupted completely and support is withdrawn. This constituency backlash, consequently, slows the rate of increase of AV, and threatens the terrorist group's survival.

Strategic goals no longer influence the terrorist group's behavior. From an organizational perspective, the terrorist group's only course of action is to attempt a continued increase in AV. A decision to reduce or maintain its AV, challenges the legitimacy of the terrorist group's violence and goals within the group itself. The group's internal tensions, about to boil over, coupled with the desire for organizational survival, only provide for an increasing AV. In its collective mind, the group's only course of action is continued violence in hopes of reestablishing legitimacy. Organizational goals completely determine the terrorist group's behavior.

As indicated in Figure 4, the terrorist group's momentum may allow continued violence, but at a decreasing rate. Terrorist groups stockpile ammunition, weapons and finances. As long as these physical resources remain available, the terrorist group continues to operate without the political and psychological resources. They are, however, completely autonomous entities at this point. At limitation, the terrorist group reaches a deprivation situation, with requirements exceeding resources. Once the resources are

depleted, the group moves into a rapid, perhaps unrecoverable, decline.

During the decline, the terrorist group is at its most dangerous. The group needs to get back into the game. To do so, publicity and headlines are




Figure 4. Terrorist Group Limitation Phase.

necessary. The danger occurs with a terrorist group at this stage in its life cycle, and given the necessary means, of staging a massive violent action in order to reestablish its former influence. Competition, especially for media, is the most significant external influence on AV.

As indicated in Figure 5, the terrorist group's decline continues until one of two possibilities occur. First, the terrorist group may be able to slow its rate of decline and maintain itself above the minimum level of violence. In this situation, the group retains some resources, enough to allow for marginal violence, but not enough to regain any real influence. Such regeneration is beyond the terrorist group's control, and as discussed in a later section, is possible only in response to changes external to the group.

Second, if the group's AV passes below the MLOV, extinction is imminent. The terrorist group no longer provides the requisite incentives to retain membership. The terrorist group no longer influences their




Figure 5. Terrorist Group Decline Phase.

constituency or the government. The terrorist group can not survive. Some members exit to join or attempt to form more viable terrorist groups. Others, burned out by the stress of their underground existence, attempt to move back above ground and establish normal lives.⁹³ Still others remain in an underground limbo, unable to act because of lack of support, but unable to live a normal existence, either by personal choice or by choice of law.

The result of this process is a terrorist group life cycle, as represented in Figure 6, with preparation, growth, limitation, decline, and extinction phases.

⁹³The case of Weather Underground member Katherine Ann Power and RAF member Susan Albrecht are good examples of this option. See Sara Rimer, "60's Radical, Linked to a Killing, Surrenders After Hiding 23 Years," *New York Times*, 16 September 1993, A1 and A9; and Guy Martin, "The Accidental Terrorist," *Mirabella*, July 1993, 44-51.




Figure 6. Terrorist Group Life Cycle.

VII. METHODOLOGY

This section discusses the methodology used to develop and test the above theory. This process occurred in four steps: (1) theory development, (2) case study selection, as discussed in the introduction, (3) life cycle development, and (3) analysis and testing.

The terrorist group life cycle remains an elusive concept, sometimes mentioned peripherally, but rarely the focus of research. Gurr observes that terrorist groups have finite life spans, with their actions plotted over time representing waves with distinctive phases of increase and decline.⁹⁴ Oots argues for the necessity of terrorist groups to seek new recruits in order to extend their life cycle. A group which fails to recruit declines and ceases to be active.⁹⁵ Crenshaw finds the search for useful information about terrorist group life cycles to be frustrating.⁹⁶

The thesis aims to develop a theory that explains the evolution of terrorist group life cycles from the perspective of the terrorist group. To develop this perspective, one must either be a terrorist, interview a terrorist, interview someone who has interviewed a

⁹⁴Gurr, "Terrorism in Democracies," 92.

⁹⁵Kent Layne Oots, "Organizational Perspectives on the Formation and Disintegration of Terrorist Groups," *Terrorism*, v. 12, 1989, 144.

⁹⁶Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, v. 3, n. 1, Spring 1991, 75.

terrorist, or extract relevant information from the statements of terrorists. The final category; e.g., memoirs, interviews, communiques, etc., forms the basis of this thesis.

Primary material is limited by the clandestine nature of terrorist groups. Several notable studies, however, use this material as their research base. Kellan examines the terrorist and the terrorist group - their reasons for joining, their frustrations and satisfactions, and the processes at work in the group - in order to better understand the nature of the adversary.⁹⁷ Leites uses this material to understand how terrorists convince themselves that their actions achieve their goals.⁹⁸ Cordes uses primary sources to analyze the terrorists use of language to legitimize, rationalize, and justify their actions, concluding that terrorists are poor communicators.⁹⁹ Rapoport uses primary material that spans approximately 100 years to consider the relationship of terrorists to the international environment in which they operate.¹⁰⁰

From this type of study, one concludes that primary terrorist literature is limited and fragmented, and that it is typically used as supporting evidence for single group or single issue research. This thesis uses available primary literature in a comparative study in

⁹⁷Kellan, *Terrorists--What are They Like?*

⁹⁸Nathan Leites, "Understanding the Next Act," *Terrorism*, v. 3, n. 1/2, 1979. 1-46.

⁹⁹Bonnie Cordes, "When Terrorists Do the Talking: Reflections on Terrorist Literature," P-7365, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, August 1987.)

¹⁰⁰David C. Rapoport, "The International World as Some Terrorists Have Seen It: A Look at a Century of Memoirs," in *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, ed., D. C. Rapoport. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 32-58.

order to develop a theory which explains the rise and fall of terrorist groups. Although the materials used in this thesis are by no means comprehensive, they represented a significant sample of the primary sources available in the English language. The primary sources used in this thesis are indicated in the bibliography by an asterisk (*).

Notwithstanding the limitations of the primary sources, perhaps the most challenging methodological problem was development of a life cycle for a real terrorist group. The idea of a life cycle is nothing new and can be found in biological, political, and organizational literature. The major problems respect to terrorist group life cycles concerned operationalization; e.g., definition, and measurement or indication.

Zald and Garner consider the causes of growth and decay in social movement organizations.¹⁰¹ They consider the impact of internal and external processes on the transformation of these organizations in order to predict their growth, decline, and direction. Their research captures the essence of organizational life cycle, as the organization's goals and ability to achieve those goals rises and falls in response to internal and external influences. With this in mind, a terrorist group's life cycle is defined as their progression through a series of developmental phases.

A life cycle typically is measured in terms of positive or negative growth or output over time. For living organisms, growth is measured as increasing or decreasing

¹⁰¹Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash Garner, "Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay, and Change," in *Social Movements in an Organizational Society: Collected Essays*, ed., M. N. Zald and J. D. McCarthy, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1987), 121-41.

populations. as influenced by competition. predation. and resource availability. For political entities. growth is measured in terms of economic indicators (trade. production. GNP. etc.). military indicators (capability. force structure. defense spending. etc.). or diplomatic indicators (foreign aid. alliances. interventions. etc.). For organizations. growth is indicated by output. size. prestige. etc. These measures when considered over time form the basis of a life cycle.

Because of a terrorist group's underground, clandestine nature. the above types of measurements are problematic. Data concerning numbers of terrorists in particular groups. their constituencies. their resources. their capabilities. etc. is either unavailable or unreliable. As do most secret organizations. terrorist groups expend much of their energy protecting this type of information. What they can not protect. however. is their above ground means of influence. Terrorist groups must act. and act violently. in order to influence their audience. This thesis. consequently. uses their violence as the measure of the terrorist group's life cycle.

The next problem concerned the means of indicating a terrorist group's violence. This problem was solved through a two step process. The first and most difficult step was development of a complete incident chronology for each case study. Most readily available chronologies report only international incidents of terrorism and may give an incomplete picture of a terrorist group's overall action. For example. a terrorist group's actions executed in the group's country of origin often are not included.

In order to overcome this limitation, multiple sources were used. The starting point for each chronology was Mickolus' three volume terrorism chronology.¹⁰² This base chronology was supplemented by additional sources including group specific research, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), newspapers, periodicals, etc. Although not perfect, each chronology highlights the major trends in the terrorist group's life cycle. Chronological sources are indicated in the bibliography by a pound sign (#).

In general, all acts of violence conducted by the particular terrorist group were included in the chronology. These included acts of terrorism in the strictest sense, as well as acts designed to obtain the support and resources necessary for the terrorist group to conduct their operations; e.g., bank robbery. The chronologies did not include incidents of internal violence; e.g., the assassination of a defector. Each incident was supported by two sources before inclusion in the chronology. The chronology begins with the first incident which the terrorist group publicly acknowledges.

The German RAF is an exception to above rule; their chronology is based strictly on terrorism without the supporting violence. This became necessary because of data availability, but does not impact the trend of the results. According to Pluchinsky, the RAF operates in a pyramidal structure with a small number of "commandos" at the top.

¹⁰²Edward F. Mickolus, *Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979*, (London: Aldwych Press, 1980.) and Edward F. Mickolus, Todd Sandler, and Jean M. Murdock, *International Terrorism in the 1980's: A Chronology of Events, 1980-1987*, 2 vols. (Ames, IO: Iowa State University Press, 1989.)

more "fighting units" next, even more support units next, and sympathizers at the bottom.¹⁰³ The commandos are the hard-core underground members of the group whose violence sets the direction for the remaining levels. The fighting units move above and below ground, but conduct actions off the commandos lead.

The RAF chronology is based on the commando and fighting unit level violence. Not included was the low level violence conducted by the support units. According to Pluchinsky, this level conducted approximately 100 actions per year, however, detailed data was unavailable.¹⁰⁴ Based on this chronology, the RAF's life cycle shows the rise and fall of commando and fighting unit violence that rests on a base of consistent support unit violence that is not indicated.

Once the chronologies were developed, each incident was coded by incident number (ID) and date (YR/MH), and according to five violence indicators: frequency (FR), tactic (TA), target (TG), location (LC), and indiscriminance (DS). The coding was based on the ability of a particular violent action, from the terrorist group's point of view, to influence their audience and receive media attention. The indicators are defined as follows (coding values appear in parentheses):

(1) Frequency - the number of terrorist actions over time. Each incident was assigned a frequency code of one (1).

¹⁰³Pluchinsky, "Organizational and Operational Analysis," 52-53.

¹⁰⁴Telephone conversation between Dennis A. Pluchinsky and the author, 7 December 1993.

(2) **Tactic** - the relative quality of the terrorist action. Actions were grouped as high (3), medium (2), and low (1). High quality tactics included kidnaping, hostage-barricade, explosive bombing, armed attack, hijacking, and assassination. Medium quality tactics included occupation, letter bombing, incendiary bombing, missile or rocket attack, sabotage, and sniping. Low quality tactics included threat, theft, break-in, conspiracy, hoax, shootout with police, arms smuggling, coercion, and propaganda. Mickolus provides detailed explanations of each of these tactics.¹⁰⁵

(3) **Target** - significance of the target attacked by the terrorists as represented by the relative influence and publicity value. Targets were grouped as high (3), medium (2), and low (1). High value targets were those of the international community; e.g., not of the region and country of origin of the terrorist group. Medium value targets were those of the terrorist group's regional community. Low value targets were those of terrorist group's country of origin. For example, the MLN kidnapping of a Uruguayan official was ranked as low; of a Latin American diplomat as medium; and of an American diplomat as high.

(4) **Location** - significance of the location of the terrorist incident as represented by the relative influence and publicity value. Locations were grouped as high (3), medium (2), and low (1). High value targets were those attacked in an international location; e.g., outside the region and country of origin of the terrorist group. Medium value targets were those attacked in the terrorist group's region, but outside the country

¹⁰⁵Mickolus, *Transnational Terrorism*, xix-xxv.

of origin. Low value targets were those attacked within the terrorist group's country of origin. For example, a RAF assassination in Germany was ranked as low; in Europe as medium; and in Latin America as high.

(5) Indiscriminance - level of selectiveness and control of a terrorist attack. Indiscriminance was grouped as high (3), medium (2), and low (1). High indiscriminance incidents were those conducted against a mass target with limited control over destruction. Medium indiscriminance incidents were those conducted against mass targets and with controlled destruction, or against point targets with uncontrolled destruction. Low indiscriminance incidents were those conducted against point targets with controlled destruction. Point targets are single individuals; mass targets are groups. Destruction is controlled if it can be halted at any time during the attack, and is uncontrolled if it cannot be stopped once the attack has started. For example, a sniper assassination was ranked as low; an aircraft hijacking and a bomb assassination were ranked as medium; a bombing of a crowded cafe as high.

Once each incident was coded, the coded values for each indicator were totalled for each year. These totals were used to produce a cumulative violence index (CVI) by adding the totals for all the indicators for each year ($CVI_{1973} = FR_{73} + TC_{73} + TG_{73} + LC_{73} + DS_{73}$). The cumulative violence index was then plotted against the corresponding year with the resulting curve representing the terrorist group's life cycle.

VIII. URUGUAY - NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT (MLN)

The MLN's life cycle is presented as Figure 6.




Figure 7. MLN Life Cycle.

A. FORMATION

Raul Sendic, a law student, formed the MLN in 1962 from radical members of the *Union de Trabajadores Azucareros de Artigas (UTAA)*, a sugar workers union, and political leftists who had split from the Uruguayan Socialist Party. The group consisted mostly of individuals with bourgeois origins. Moss notes that the "rank and file of the

movement [were] young, with some university education, and of middle-class antecedents."¹⁰⁶ Early actions occurred above ground and were limited to demonstrations and other political protest.

B. PREPARATION

The MLN preparation phase, 1963-67, was characterized by ideological, strategic, and tactical development, and organization of infrastructure. During this period the MLN maintained a low profile, focussing on the establishment of supply sources and mobilization of a constituency. Supply efforts constituted the bulk of their action, concentrating on the steady accumulation of arms, explosives, ammunition, and money.

The MLN's first armed action occurred on 31 July 1963, when the Swiss Rifle Club in Knave Helvecia, Colonia, was robbed of firearms. This action was typical of this phase's violence: low frequency of actions, low to medium quality tactics, low value targets, low value locations, and low to medium indiscriminance. The MLN first identified themselves as "Tupamaros,"¹⁰⁷ on 9 August 1965, in a communique issued after the bombing of a Bayer warehouse.

Although publicity, for the most part, was avoided, the MLN actively fostered the "Robin Hood" image that aided them in obtaining significant popular support in later

¹⁰⁶Robert Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay," *Problems of Communism*, v. 20, September-October 1971.

¹⁰⁷According to Carlos Nunez, *The Tupamaros: Urban Guerrillas of Uruguay*. (New York: Times Change Press, 1970), 20, the name *tupamaros* derived from an Inca caudillo Tupac Amaru who led a rebellion for the independence of the Indians in 1870 and was publicly dismembered by the Spanish for his efforts.

phases. For example, on 24 December 1963, the "Hunger Commando" seized the contents of a food chain truck and distributed turkeys and chickens in the Montevideo slums. Publicity was vital to later MLN operations; it was during this phase that they became expert in its use.

The MLN used this type of action to consolidate their constituency. Illustrative of the passive level was the comment of a 75 year old pensioner who, when asked what the Tupamaros meant, replied that "to me they seem just like the first Christians." Similarly a 43 year old teacher answered that "at the moment they're the only hope for this country."¹⁰⁸ On the active level, the MLN developed *Comites de Apoyo Tupamaro* (Tupamaro Support Committees/CAT's) around the militant cells to provide physical support, recruits, and intelligence, and act as the above ground link to society.¹⁰⁹

C. GROWTH

The MLN growth phase, 1967-71, began in January 1967 with the bombing of the US Consulate in Montevideo and was precipitated by the first MLN deaths in December 1966. This phase was characterized by increasing frequency of actions, increasing quality tactics, low to high value targets, low value locations, and increasing indiscriminance. Although bank and arms robberies peaked during this phase, a marked shift toward political action occurred.

¹⁰⁸Quoted in Gilio, *Tupamaros*, 79 and 82.

¹⁰⁹Urbano, "Interview With Urbano" in Kohl and Litt, *Urban Guerrilla Warfare*, 278-79.

The MLN actual violence began to accelerate, with the burning of a General Motor's factory in June 1967, to bombings, domestic kidnapping and assassinations, and actual site occupations. Ronfeldt notes that after the GM action MLN "attacks became increasingly ambitious and bloody...as the revolutionaries took the offensive and campaigned with the full array of guerrilla tactics."¹¹⁰ Porzecanski explains that:

Robberies of money became a monthly, then a weekly event; political kidnapping was launched and repeatedly applied; propaganda actions were initiated and continued until, by the end of 1969, the existence of the urban guerrilla organization could escape no one and "Tupamaro" became a household word. The confrontation was on, and month by month it became increasingly violent and severe.¹¹¹

This violence acceleration culminated with the occupation of the town of Pando, an action the Tupamaros described as "a qualitative leap forward,"¹¹² on 8 October 1969, and multiple diplomatic kidnapping on 31 July 1970. The MLN were losing their Robin Hood image.

The violence surrounding their diplomatic kidnapping campaign, a consequence of external pressures and internal tensions, accelerated the MLN beyond its ALOV. This campaign began with the abduction of Dan Mitrone (USAID public safety officer) and Aloysio Dias Gomide (Brazilian consul), and attempted abduction Gordon Jones (first secretary, U.S. Embassy) on 31 July 1970; included kidnapping of U.S. agricultural expert

¹¹⁰David Ronfeldt, *The Mitrone Kidnapping in Uruguay*, Rand Note N-1571-DOS/DARA/RC, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1987), 1.

¹¹¹Arturo C. Porzecanski, *Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), 52.

¹¹²Quoted in Gilio, 120.

Claude Fly on 7 August 1970; and ended with abduction of British Ambassador Geoffrey Jackson on 8 January 1971.¹¹³ Mitrone was executed on 9 August, precipitating a popular backlash against the MLN.

Prior to the diplomatic campaign, MLN kidnapping and assassination was limited to Uruguayan officials. Butler asserted that their [strategic] goal was to "undermine and humiliate the government to such an extent that the government would have to resort to panic measures that would in turn alienate government support while building the terrorists' own image."¹¹⁴ The MLN achieved this goal with domestic action, painting the government as weak, ineffective, and unable to respond to the terrorist threat.

Diplomatic kidnapping, however, added several new dimensions. First, the MLN decision to escalate from domestic to foreign diplomatic kidnapping occurred in response to contagion of terrorist success abroad. Prior to the initiation of the MLN campaign, a series of kidnapping of foreign diplomats occurred in the Dominican Republic (24 March 1970), Argentina (24 March 1970), and Brazil (5 April and 11 June 1970).¹¹⁵ This new

¹¹³See Geoffrey Jackson, *People's Prison*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1973, and Claude Fly, *No Hope But God*, (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1973) for their experiences as MLN prisoners.

¹¹⁴Ross E. Butler, "Terrorism in Latin America," in *International Terrorism: National, Regional, and Global Perspectives*, ed., Y. Alexander (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), 54.

¹¹⁵Norman Antokol and Mayer Nudell, *No One is Neutral: Political Hostage-Taking in the Modern World* (Medina, OH: Alpha Publications, 1990), 44-48. As discussed in their case study, the FLQ used the MLN example when they kidnapped two diplomats in October 1970.

type of kidnapping made media headlines: the domestic version became old news. The MLN's actual violence increased qualitatively as a result.

Second, success in the new kidnapping was perceived by the MLN as strengthening the relationship with their constituency by showing them as not only effective against the Uruguayan government, but able to take on foreign governments as well. The new kidnapping further emphasized the weakness of the Uruguayan government, painting them as unable to protect the diplomats of key allies.

The decision to execute Mitrone altered the strategic calculus and was made for several reasons. First, nine of the top MLN leaders, including Sendic, were captured two days before Mitrone was executed; a short time later the replacement leadership was captured as well. These captures critically altered MLN organizational behavior. Since MLN prisoners were not killed previously, and Mitrone was alive before the leaders were captured, it is reasonable to assume that their capture increased MLN tension, created organizational panic, and resulted in faulty decision making. Sendic supported this assumption: "those captured lost all contact with the others and when the deadline came the group that was left with Mitrone did not know what to do. So they decided to carry out the threat."¹⁶ Mitrone was supposed to have been kept in extended captivity, as were Fly and Jackson.

¹⁶Quoted in Shirley Christian, "Uruguayan Clears Up 'State of Siege' Killing," *New York Times*, 21 June 1987, A5.

The second reason behind the decision to execute Mitrone was the desire to cooperate with their terrorist brethren abroad and maintain the utility of diplomatic kidnapping as a tactic. "Urbano" discussed this desire:

The carrying out of this sentence implies a responsibility to the movement not only to its people but to the other revolutionary movements of Latin America as well...The kidnapping-exchange method must be carried to its logical consequences in order to save it as a tool...In taking a step of this kind we were thinking not only of our situation here but of the situation faced by all the other revolutionary movements in Latin America and what kidnapping meant to them.¹¹⁷

If a group borrowed a tactic from abroad, they accepted a responsibility to ensure the tactic remained effective.

The MLN actual violence increased as a result. The backlash of public opinion, however, created by Mitrone's murder negatively affected the MLN. Ronfeldt concludes the result was that the constituency "jolted out of its apathy...continued to provide information against the Tupamaros, exceeding the police capacity to absorb and utilize such assistance."¹¹⁸ Abraham Guillen, considered to be the theorist behind MLN ideology, observed that with this incident, the MLN "not only failed to accomplish a political objective, but also suffered a political reversal in their newly acquired role as assassins-the image acquired through hostile mass media."¹¹⁹ The Tupamaros were no longer Robin Hood.

¹¹⁷Urbano, "Interview with Urbano," in *Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America*, eds., J. Kohl and J. Litt, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1974), 266-67.

¹¹⁸Ronfeldt, *Mitrone Kidnapping*, 51.

¹¹⁹Abraham Guillen, *Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla: The Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillen*, trans. and ed., D. C. Hodges (New York: William Morrow, 1973), 270.

A different version of events implies that the constituency reaction resulted from the government's engineering of events, including false communiques, and was quickly recognized as propaganda. The MLN countered the government's efforts by using Mitrone's alleged status as a CIA agent who was training the police in torture techniques as justification for the execution. Labrousse notes in this case the constituency withdrawal was a temporary reaction to the shock of the MLN strategy changes.¹²⁰

In a sense, however, the diplomatic kidnapping campaign and Mitrone execution achieved the goal of forcing the government into repressive measures. On 11 August 1970, the General Legislative Assembly approved the suspension of personal security rights for 20 days and provided the President with special dictatorial powers. On 12 January 1971, personal liberties were suspended for an additional 40 days. Mitrone notes that these actions were unprecedented in Uruguayan history, clearing the way for excessive and inappropriate police and military activity, including search without warrant, detention without charge, and interrogation using pentothal.¹²¹

These excessive and inappropriate activities may have provided for some reconstitution of the MLN relationship with their constituency. Labrousse observes that

The population was incensed by the continual police controls. Although the police behaved correctly when they searched bourgeois houses, they did not always do so when they searched houses in working class areas. Doors were broken down when the owners were absent and things were stolen. People began to feel that they were

¹²⁰Labrousse, *Tupamaros*, 113-14.

¹²¹Ronfeldt, *Mitrone Kidnapping*, 51.

paying dearly for the presence of an American policeman, who 'after all could have stayed at home.' Tongues were loosened. Approval was expressed....¹²²

At the very least, the government response provided for continued violence as their constituency determined whether the MLN or the government was the lesser of two evils.

From this point, MLN actual violence continued to spiral upward until July 1971. During 1971, MLN violence was exclusively political, with only six robberies the entire year. Political kidnapping was rampant (one-third more incidents than in all previous years combined), bombings were commonplace (almost the same number of incidents as in all previous years combined), and assassination continued.

Competition compounded this spiralling actual violence. Prior to 1971, terrorist competitors were a minor irritant to the MLN. On 12 November 1969, for example, ten *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Orientales* (FARO) guerrillas robbed the Aguada branch of *Banco de Montevideo* of 15,000,000 pesos. By 1971, however, several other groups, including FARO and *Organizacion Popular Revolucionaria-Treinta y Tres* (OPR-33) were actively competing with the MLN. OPR-33 boasted a number of kidnappings, including four prominent businessmen who were involved in labor disputes.¹²³

D. LIMITATION

The MLN reached limitation in mid-1971.

¹²²Labrousse, *Tupamaros*, 113.

¹²³Porzecanski, *Uruguay's Tupamaros*, 60.

E. DECLINE

Two factors, coupled with support and resource limitations, precipitated the MLN decline. The first was a unilateral decision to limit their violence between September 1971 and February 1972 to allow for peaceful elections in November 1971. The MLN, who announced support for the Broad Front coalition in January 1971, wanted to allow the political process an opportunity to succeed. Second, and more important, the government used this lull to enhance the effectiveness of the security apparatus, especially by including the armed forces in counterterrorist efforts.

Inclusion of the armed forces in the MLN campaign in September 1971 marked the beginning of effective government action and the decline of the MLN: decreasing frequency of actions, high quality tactics, low value targets, low value locations, and low indiscriminance. Taking advantage of the election cease fire, the armed forces intelligence apparatus began to develop background information and plans for counterterrorist operations. When the MLN renewed their offensive in December 1971 with the Paysandu proclamation,¹²⁴ the armed forces were ready.

In response to the assassination of a Uruguayan navy captain and three others on 14 April 1972, the government declared a state of internal war, allowing the military to pursue its counterterrorist objective without regard to judicial accountability; e.g., interrogation and torture. This government action, in contrast to previous attempts, was effective because intelligence preparation provided for selective targeting of MLN

¹²⁴Reprinted in Kohl and Litt, *Urban Guerrilla Warfare*, 297-99.

membership and infrastructure, eliminating the broad impact on the population. The ensuing violence led to dozens of casualties on both sides, alienation of the MLN constituency, and dwindling resources.

F. EXTINCTION

The MLN reached effective extinction by the end of 1972.

IX. CANADA- QUEBEC LIBERATION FRONT (FLQ)

The FLQ's life cycle is presented as Figure 7.




Figure 8. FLQ Life Cycle.

A. FORMATION

The FLQ formed from a long standing movement that's goal was a separate French speaking Quebec. The FLQ looked back to the most violent revolt in Canadian history. Louis-Joseph Papineau's *Patriotes*, who rose against English occupation in 1837-1838. Their more recent antecedent was the milieu of resistance groups that germinated in Quebec in the late 1950's and early 1960's. The FLQ formed from radicalized elements

of many of these, to the point where the first FLQ actions were conducted by a *Rassemblement pour l' independance nationale* (RIN) cell which simply changed their name.¹²⁵ In the mid-1960's, however, the FLQ was co-opted from their separatist roots by sociorevolutionary elements, creating a hybrid terrorist group.¹²⁶

The FLQ drew their passive and active constituency from Quebec nationalists. A consistent base of passive sympathy was provided by *Quebecois* society. The more sympathesizers moved toward the political left, the more vocal they became. Active constituency was provided by the most extreme members of the left. The FLQ recruited from the radicalized membership of that extreme left.

In addition to their hybrid nature, the FLQ was unusual because of their organizational structure. According to Crelinsten, the FLQ consisted of diverse and loosely organized semi-autonomous cells which lacked central leadership and were linked only through a common ideal of independent Quebec.¹²⁷ Morf, consequently, identifies five waves of FLQ activity associated with separate cells and each wave ending as the

¹²⁵See Fournier, *F. L. Q.*, 1-35 for the roots of the FLQ. See Leandre Bergeron. *The History of Quebec: A Patriote's Handbook*, trans., B. Markus, (Toronto: NC Press, 1981) for a sympathesizer's history of the Quebec separatist movement.

¹²⁶See Waldman, "Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism," 253-54 for discussion of the hybrid nature of the FLQ.

¹²⁷Ronald D. Crelinsten, "The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ During the October Crisis of 1970," in *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, ed., D. C. Rapoport, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 59-61.

cell was captured.¹²⁸ The FLQ life cycle presented here, however, is a function of overlapping violence of all cells and is a product of internal tensions between and within the cells.

A consequence of the FLQ's formation was an early high level of violence that was sustained throughout their life cycle. FLQ high quality tactics (bombings), low value location (Quebec), and high indiscriminance remained consistent. What varied across their life cycle phases was the frequency and target of their violence.

B. PREPARATION

In the preparation phase, 1963-1967, and after the destruction of the initial cell, frequency of action remained relatively low. Bombings were conducted in support of nationalist and anti-colonial goals: dynamite in mailboxes of English suburbs, and at national government, police, and military facilities. The primary focus of this phase, however, was resource appropriation; e.g., bank, arms, and ammunition robberies.

During this phase government action was ineffective. For example, on 12 April 1963, the RCMP and Montreal police launched a dragnet operation in Montreal in response to the indignation and outrage of the FLQ's first killing. These "Good Friday Raids" included search and arrest without warrants. Fournier notes that these raids were universally criticized and condemned. One reaction was a demonstration against repression in front of a RCMP headquarters in which some demonstrators were injured

¹²⁸Morf, *Terror in Quebec*. As discussed in Crelinsten, "Internal Dynamics," 59, Laurendeau identifies nine distinct phases.

by the police. Police action if it did anything, aided the FLQ cause, and brought their constituency closer.

Impatience for action was apparent in the FLQ as early as 1964. *La Cognee* (FLQ newspaper) editor "Paul Lemoyne" observed that:

Several activists are becoming impatient. They criticize what they call our wait-and-see policy, our refusal to bypass necessary steps, our determination to prepare realistically for direct action. They want us to put them in uniform and put rifles in their hands. These people show a lack of realism, and a spirit of adventurism.¹²⁹

This impatience created the tensions that eventually resulted in action.

Crelinsten argues that the FLQ changed with injection of Marxist/Socialist thought by Pierre Vallieres and Charles Gagnon in 1966.¹³⁰ Vallieres described FLQ violence prior to this change:

At the level of action, there seems to be a tendency to act on a day to day basis, whenever the occasion arises, using bombs or Molotov cocktails, organizing demonstrations or other political events, rather than pursuing an overall strategy, based on an in-depth analysis of the balance of forces in Quebec, North America, and the world, and not just with the aim of making noise, but of overthrowing the established order and setting up a government of and for the people of Quebec....¹³¹

His goal was to place FLQ violence in such a strategic framework.¹³²

¹²⁹Quoted in Fournier, *F. L. Q.*, 66.

¹³⁰Crelinsten, "Internal Dynamics," 62 marks this change by comparing the first FLQ manifesto issued in 1963 with the one promulgated during the October Crisis in 1970. The first was addressed to "patriots," the enemy was "Anglo-Saxon colonialism," and the solution was "national independence." The second was addressed to the "workers of Quebec," the enemies were the "big bosses, finance companies, and banks," and the solution was revolution.

¹³¹Quoted in Fournier, *F. L. Q.*, 91.

¹³²Pierre Vallieres, *White Niggers of America: The Precocious Autobiography of a Quebec "Terrorist,"* trans., J. Pinkham, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971.)

C. GROWTH

The beginning of the FLQ growth phase was marked by Vallieres' and Gagnon's arrest in New York in September 1966 and subsequent extradition to Canada in January 1967. These arrests were followed on 24 July 1967 by the cry of "*Vive le Quebec libre*" by French President Charles de Gaulle during a visit to Quebec. Fournier argues that de Gaulle's speech legitimized the separatist movement.¹³³ In addition, the following month the police conducted over 115 arrests without warrant to forestall Dominion Day demonstrations. These arrests were denounced universally as kidnapping.¹³⁴ FLQ actual violence increased as a result of the sociorevolutionary changes coupled with these catalyzing events.

The FLQ growth phase, 1967-1970, was characterized by increasing frequency of violence, high quality tactics, low to medium value targets, low value locations, and increasing indiscriminance. FLQ bombings were increasingly lethal; e.g., simultaneous and enhanced capacity, and began to target individuals, as well as facilities. For example, a four-bomb display was executed outside Montreal City Hall on 14 December 1968 where the mayor just offered \$10,000 reward for information concerning the FLQ bombers; a super bomb exploded at the Montreal Stock Exchange on 13 February 1969 "to strike a telling blow at the heart of the capitalist system;"¹³⁵ and bombs exploded at the homes of plant managers, businessmen, and police and government officials.

¹³³Fournier, *F. L. Q.*, 112.

¹³⁴*Ibid.*, 101.

¹³⁵*Ibid.*, 150.

The stock exchange bombing is illustrative because of its location at the end of a period of accelerating FLQ violence, and for the reaction it elicited. From August 1968 to March 1969, the FLQ Geoffroy cell was responsible for 75 bombings in and about Montreal.¹³⁶ of which the stock exchange was one. Regardless of the 20 injuries and \$1 million damage, the FLQ constituency remained supportive. An editorial by Claude Ryan in Montreal *Le Devoir* summarized this sentiment:

The explosion at the Stock Exchange arouses (and rightly so) a general feeling of horror and condemnation. It must not be forgotten, however, that this blow was aimed at an institution which symbolizes, in the eyes of thousands of citizens who love justice, serious inequalities in our society. In the face of such acts, the immediate need is to defend the city against the dangers which threaten it. It must be remembered that hidden behind the wealth of a place like the Stock Exchange, are serious injustices in the city, and these injustices give rise, in a large measure, to the violence that we condemn today.¹³⁷

Ryan and his like, although not agreeing with FLQ methods, agreed with their goals.

This agreement ended, however, with the October Crisis in 1970 in which two officials were kidnapped, and one subsequently executed.¹³⁸ The idea of political kidnapping, however, was considered earlier. In 1968, Vallieres wrote to Jacques Larue-Langlois from prison that:

¹³⁶Morf, *Terror in Quebec*, 138.

¹³⁷Quoted in Fournier, *F. L. Q.*, 151.

¹³⁸The October Crisis is described in detail in Fournier, *F.L.Q.*, 211-72; Morf, *Terror in Quebec*, 164-70; Crelinsten, "Internal Dynamics," 61-65; John Saywell, *Quebec 70: A Documentary Narrative*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971); Pierre Vallieres, *The Assassination of Pierre Laporte: Behind the October '70 Scenario*, trans., R. Wells. (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1977); and Carole de Vault with William Johnson, *The Informer: Confessions of an Ex-Terrorist*, Toronto: Fleet Books, 1982.)

if you really want to get us out of here before independence comes, you'll have to take drastic steps and organize a spectacular operation: a political kidnapping - two influential members of the Quebec government or the Trudeau government, or maybe two judges, who would only be released in return for our freedom.¹³⁹

Tensions created by the desire to support imprisoned comrades was one cause of the increase in FLQ actual violence that culminated in the October Crisis.

This crisis was critical to the FLQ, moving them beyond ALOV to limitation, and into their decline phase. The crisis began in September 1970 when nine members of the FLQ network headed by Jacques Lanctot (Liberation Cell) and Paul Rose (Chenier Cell) held a strategy meeting. During this meeting, differences of opinion, and consequently tensions, emerged. The sources of these tensions were described in the Duchaine Inquiry as:

Jacques Lanctot was impatient with the slowness of preparations, the financing that went nowhere and the organization that dragged on forever, and announced that he was ready for action. Paul Rose calculated that the group's resources (house, weapons, money, etc.) were insufficient to sustain a large-scale operation.¹⁴⁰

After all-night "discussion," the group voted five to four in favor of immediate action. Lanctot and his cell went immediately into hiding to prepare for a kidnapping at the end of September. Rose and two other members of his cell left for the United States to raise money.

On 5 October 1970, the Liberation Cell kidnapped British Trade Commissioner James Cross. Although this kidnapping involved both provincial and federal governments,

¹³⁹Fournier, *F. L. Q.*, 133.

¹⁴⁰Quoted in Crelinsten, "Internal Dynamics," 68. The Duchaine Inquiry was the official investigation of the October Crisis.

according to Crelinsten, a sense of extreme crisis did not result immediately. This political kidnapping was the first of its kind in North America, following closely and contagious with, however, the MLN examples of August 1970. Rose was still in the United States and was unaware of the kidnapping until after it happened.

The government took a hard line and refused to negotiate, but did allow broadcast of the FLQ manifesto on 8 October. This broadcast created a swell of public sympathy for the FLQ. *Parti Quebecois* member and later FLQ informer Carole de Vault described the feeling:

Everyone was discussing the manifesto the next morning. Everyone now felt involved. Some were for, some against, but no one was neutral. The populist tone [of the manifesto] had touched a responsive chord among the Quebecois. It seemed to many that the FLQ had just spoken the plain truth - expressed in bold language what everyone privately thought.¹⁴¹

On 10 October, the Chenier Cell kidnapped Acting Premier of Quebec James Cross in support of the Liberation Cell and to gain additional leverage. This action was not coordinated between the two cells, a lack of coordination that continued throughout the crisis. According to Crelinsten, the second kidnapping precipitated the sense of crisis in the government that was not apparent after the first one.¹⁴²

In the face of government intransigence, public sympathy for the FLQ continued to grow after the second kidnapping. This sympathy was expressed by strikes by college and university students, and a statement by a group of influential leaders, the "declaration of the sixteen," that supported negotiation and attacked the government's hard line.

¹⁴¹de Vault, *The Informer*, 91.

¹⁴²Crelinsten, "Internal Dynamics," 63.

Early in the morning of 16 October, the government passed the War Measures Act which suspended the Canadian Declaration of Rights, allowing arrests without warrant and preventative detention for up to 21 days without charges and 90 days without a trial date. At daybreak, the police and army began the "Black Friday" raids which eventually led to 500 arrests, 4,600 searches leading to confiscation of property, and 31,700 searches as part of police sweeps. The individuals arrested were held for an week on average and many up to 21 days; 90 percent were released without being charged.¹⁴³

Carole de Vault captured Quebec's reaction to the government's action:

When I heard the news of the War Measures Act on October 16, I burst into tears. 'Poor Quebec!' I kept repeating as I wept. I had always had a certain admiration for Pierre Trudeau....But I've never forgiven him the War Measures Act....¹⁴⁴

The *Brandon Sun* expressed concern that the "government may have struck a blow for the FLQ. Not at them" and that this action would greatly enlarge the forces of radicalism.¹⁴⁵

Eleven years later, House of Commons member Jean Marchand described this act as "bringing up a cannon to kill a fly."¹⁴⁶ Ironically, the effect of these measures may have been the consolidation of constituency support.

Just as ironically, on 17 October, Laporte was executed, moving the FLQ beyond the ALOV and destroying this constituency support. Although circumstances surrounding this death remain vague, tensions within the cells certainly played a role. These tensions

¹⁴³Fournier, *F. L. Q.*, 247.

¹⁴⁴de Vault, *The Informer*, 103.

¹⁴⁵Saywell, *Quebec* 70, 95-96.

¹⁴⁶Quoted in Fournier, *F. L. Q.*, 250.

were a function of the inability of the cells to communicate with each other and agree upon a strategy. Attempts to communicate through their communiques were unsuccessful. According to Crelinsten, an impasse was reached in the only meeting between the cells: Cross's life would be spared, but Laporte's death threat would remain.¹⁴⁷ These tensions resulted in a need to act within the Chenier Cell. Chenier cell member Francis Simard believed that "for us, if October made a statement, it was not solely by means of a manifesto, but by the action itself. By revealing a force, that of those who never get a chance to speak." The FLQ communique implied similar needs:

The arrogance of the federal government and its hireling Bourassa [head of Quebec government] has forced the FLQ to act. Pierre Laporte, Minister of Unemployment and Assimilation, was executed at 6:18 this evening by Dieppe (Royal 22e) cell. We shall overcome.¹⁴⁸

This action occurred as a result of underground inefficiency that aggravated internal tensions that, in turn, fostered faulty decision making.

The result of Laporte's death was a dramatic shift in public sympathy and withdrawal of constituency support. *Parti Quebecois* leader Rene Levesque described Laporte's murderers as "inhuman creatures...if they really believed they had a cause, they have killed it along with Mr. Laporte."¹⁴⁹ This support withdrawal, coupled with the government's ability to take advantage of the changing sympathies, precipitated FLQ decline. The crisis actually ended in December 1970, when Cross was released through

¹⁴⁷Crelinsten, "Internal Dynamics," 79.

¹⁴⁸Quoted in Fournier, *F. L. Q.*, 256.

¹⁴⁹Quoted in *Ibid.*, 257.

negotiation that allowed his captors safe passage to Cuba, and when the Chenier cell was captured.

D. LIMITATION

The FLQ reached limitation in October 1970.

E. DECLINE

The FLQ decline phase, 1970-1971, was characterized by decreasing frequency of actions, high quality tactics, low value targets, low value locations, and high indiscriminance. Although several attempts were made to reestablish the FLQ, the most significant aspect of their decline was the fragmentation that occurred. This fragmentation was exemplified by the split between Vallieres and Gagnon.

Both men were released from jail in June 1971. Vallieres, after spending several months underground, came out of hiding in December 1971, left the FLQ, and joined the *Parti Quebecois*. Of his break with the FLQ, Vallieres remarked:

The important lesson of October '70 is that the establishment feels and knows that it is threatened first and foremost not by the FLQ but by the converging political practices of the *Parti quebecois*, the trade unions and the citizen's committees. The fact that a significant part of the population up until now has sympathized with the actions of the FLQ, supported its October Manifesto, and admired the political prisoners, does not mean that the masses consider the FLQ as an alternative power.¹⁵⁰

Vallieres, consequently, abandoned violence as a means of achieving political goals.

Gagnon left the FLQ the previous September to form his own radical party to the left of the *Parti Quebecois*. He disagreed with Vallieres, however, concerning the utility of violence and condemned Vallieres' direction:

¹⁵⁰Quoted in *Ibid.*, 313.

It is right to break with the FLQ in the sense that the objective conditions do not exist in Quebec at the present time. Spontaneous violence, isolated from popular struggles, does not by itself constitute a revolutionary path. But what is mistaken and totally indefensible is for Vallieres to go over completely to the PQ.¹⁵¹

F. EXTINCTION

Ross and Gurr conclude that this strategic disagreement and fragmentation was echoed throughout the FLQ,¹⁵² leading to their extinction by mid-1972.

¹⁵¹Ibid., 315.

¹⁵²Ross and Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides," 414.

X. MIDDLE EAST - ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION (ANO)

The ANO's life cycle is presented as Figure 8.




Figure 9. ANO Life Cycle.

A. FORMATION

The Third Fatah Congress in 1971 was a watershed between Fatah moderates led by Arafat and extremists which included Abu Nidal. Seale notes that this congress marked the beginning of a split from the PLO mainstream of extremists united over issues of increased democracy in Fatah and violent action against King Hussein in the wake of

the September 1970 war.¹⁵³ This split was solidified in 1974 by Palestinian National Congress resolutions that subordinated armed struggle to political action as the means of dealing with Israel. These resolutions coincided with the removal of Abu Nidal as Fatah's representative in Iraq in July 1974 and the death sentence passed on him in absentia by Fatah in November 1974.

The ANO passive constituency, as with all the PLO factions, grew from the Palestinian diaspora, whose pride, hope and frustration led them to look to extremists as a means of achieving a homeland. Wege observes that ANO found their active constituency from the Palestinian radical fringes - students whose membership was bought with educational support, the disaffected of the refugee camps, and the radicalized fragmentation of other terrorist groups.¹⁵⁴ This active constituency provided ANO with a core of experienced terrorists with which to begin operations.

Perhaps the most important support for the ANO came in the form of the pseudo-constituency of state sponsorship. Seale explains that ANO received a home, and varying levels of logistical support and security from Iraq (1974-1983), Syria (1981-1987), and Libya (1985-1991).¹⁵⁵ Although state sponsorship allowed continued violence after their constituency was withdrawn, this was not a panacea. State sponsorship was not free and was never consistent.

¹⁵³Seale, *Abu Nidal*, 86.

¹⁵⁴Carl A. Wege, "The Abu Nidal Organization," *Terrorism*, v. 14, 1991, 59-60.

¹⁵⁵Seale, *Abu Nidal*, 109-150.

A cost and benefit of state sponsorship was the affect on ANO violence. ANO violence was based on two interrelated goals: those of the group and those of the state sponsor. The means of execution, however, remained a uniquely ANO prerogative. Across its life cycle, ANO's goals were armed struggle against Israel and allies and disruption of diplomatic approaches to Israel by moderate Arabs and PLO members. In Abu Nidal's words:

But if our first priority is the struggle against the Zionest enemy in the occupied territories-and our progress here can be seen from the rockets which rained onto Begin's residential district-our next priority is the destruction of the reactionary regimes in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.¹⁵⁶

As a result, a base level of violence focussed on Arab and PLO moderates existed for all the phases of ANO's life. Decisions designed to achieve the state sponsor's objectives changed, however, as sponsorship shifted from Iraq to Syria to Libya.

B. PREPARATION

A consequence of ANO's formation was entry into the terrorist game at a relatively high level of capability. ANO's preparation phase began in the early 1970's, corresponding to Abu Nidal's assignment as PLO representative to Iraq, and ended in 1979. With notable exceptions, this phase was characterized by low frequency of actions (relative to the later phases), high quality tactics (hijacking, armed attack, assassination), medium value targets (moderate Arabs), medium to high value locations (Middle East), and low to medium indiscriminance (point and mass targets with controlled destruction).

¹⁵⁶Abu Nidal, "Most Wanted Man, Abu-Nidal, Speaks," Interview by Fulvio Grimaldi, London *The Middle East*, n. 45, July 1978, 27.

The preparation phase, consequently, began with reorganization and consolidation of existing infrastructure, and redefinition of ideology, strategy, and tactics. Resource efforts during this phase primarily focussed on establishing weapons and ammunition caches in Europe between 1973-75. Finance was readily available from PLO accounts in Iraq and from the Iraqis.

ANO's early actions, although not representative of this phase, illustrated the level of higher relative capability with which the ANO began its operations. Compounding this capability were external pressures that influenced the increase in ANO actual violence. Seale concludes that ANO strategy development was influenced by right wing Jewish movements of the 1940's.¹⁵⁷ Ironically, Abu Nidal was impressed by Irgun and its radical offshoot, the Stern Gang.

On a more tangible level, the internationalization of terrorism became extremely contagious in the late 1960's and early 1970's. After 1968, a wave of hijacking and airport attacks swept through the Middle East and Europe.¹⁵⁸ As noted by Schiller, terrorist groups, recognizing the minimal risk, began to compete in efforts to outdo one

¹⁵⁷Seale, *Abu Nidal*, 71.

¹⁵⁸Vaughn F. Bishop, "The Role of Terrorism in the Palestinian Resistance Movement: June 1967-October 1973," *The Politics of Terrorism*, ed., M. Stohl, (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1979); Khaled, *My People Shall Live*; and Peter Snow and David Phillips, *The Arab Hijack War: The True Story of 25 Days in September, 1970* (New York: Ballentine Books, 1970.)

another in order to capitalize on the media exposure.¹⁵⁹ ANO entered the terrorist game at the height of this competition, and for the next decade raised the stakes, defining the level of violence for the competition.

Decisions designed to achieve ANO goals split into pre-1978 and post-1978 phases. Prior to 1978, ANO actions focussed on general disruption of political overtures toward Israel. Seale asserts that the seizure of the Saudi Embassy in Paris in September 1973 was an attempt by Iraq and ANO to disrupt the Fourth Nonaligned Conference that opened the same day in Algiers.¹⁶⁰ Similarly, Melman argues that the KLM hijacking in November 1974 was an attempt by ANO to force the return of the PLO delegation and disrupt Arafat's speech to the United Nations.¹⁶¹

ANO began attacks in response to Iraqi goals with its "Black June" campaign against Syrian targets in 1976. Typical of this campaign were the September 1976 attack on the Semiramis Hotel in Damascus; the October 1976 attack on the Syrian Embassies in Rome and Islamabad; and the December 1976 and October 1977 assassination attempts of the Syrian foreign minister.

¹⁵⁹David Th. Schiller, "A Battlegroup Divided: The Palestinian Fedayeen," in *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, ed., D. C. Rapoport, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 97.

¹⁶⁰Seale, *Abu Nidal*, 92.

¹⁶¹Yossi Melman, *The Master Terrorist: The True Story of Abu Nidal* (New York: Avon Books, 1986), 97. See also Abu Iyad with Eric Rouleau, *My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle*, trans., L. B. Koseoglu, (New York: Times Books, 1981), 149-54.

Melman notes that ANO began to target PLO moderates in response to PLO's decision to continue the political line in the wake of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977.¹⁶² In January, ANO began their campaign against PLO moderates when Sa'id Hammami, a PLO dove, was murdered in London. Seale states that Hammami's murder began a series of murders that, over the next five years, killed "the most thoughtful and persuasive Palestinian spokesmen in the West."¹⁶³ This campaign solidified the break between ANO and Fatah.

C. GROWTH

Melman identifies 1979 as a turning point where ANO operations began to shift from the Middle East to Europe.¹⁶⁴ ANO's growth phase, consequently, began with this shift and ended in late 1985. This phase was characterized by increasing frequency of operations, continuing high quality tactics (armed attacks, bombings, assassination), medium to high value targets (Arab and international community), high value locations (outside Middle East; primarily Europe), and increasing indiscriminance (mass targets, controlled to uncontrolled destruction).

In 1979, ANO took the offensive as the decision was made to target the international Jewish community. This decision was precipitated by the PLO's reaction to the Camp David Accords. Melman observes that this reaction was initially one of

¹⁶²Melman, *Master Terrorist*, 104.

¹⁶³Seale, *Abu Nidal*, 163

¹⁶⁴Melman, *Master Terrorist*, 14.

complete rejection, and was perceived by the extremists as a signal to embark on a major terrorist campaign.¹⁶⁵ Arafat, subsequently, decided to continue pursuit of the diplomatic line. ANO's reaction was to increase the violence of the campaign against PLO moderates, and to attack the international Jewish community in order force Israeli reprisals and undermine Arafat's political approach.

Typical of this campaign was the assassination attempt on the Israeli Ambassador in London in June 1982, at a time when the Israelis were poised on the Lebanese border, precipitating a full scale invasion. Abu Nidal, however, justified the act and denied its consequences:

The Zionist Ambassador in London was a leading newsmonger and founder of the Zionist secret service, Mosad. We attacked the ambassador at a time when he had taken over a leading role for Mosad in Europe...A blind man would have realized the Zionists planned to invade Lebanon. However, the claim that the attack on the ambassador was the spark unleashing the war is neither evident nor valid.

Whether evident or valid, this assassination attempt resulted in massacres at the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps, as well as the complete destruction of the PLO in Lebanon. These results were consistent with ANO goals.

In 1983-84, ANO's actual violence decreased, but it maintained at a relatively high level. This decrease corresponded to the change in state sponsorship from Iraq to Syria and to a split with ANO's constituency. At this point, ANO had gone too far in its campaign against moderate PLO members, moving them beyond the ALOV. The reaction of Abu Iyad, one of Abu Nidal's strongest supporters from the early days of Fatah, to the

¹⁶⁵Ibid., 104.

August 1978 assassination of Ali Yassin, one of the PLO's most popular members, exemplified this attitude: "I never wanted to kill Abu Nidal until the day he murdered Ali Yassin."¹⁶⁶ To the PLO, this murder made no sense.

This campaign culminated with the April 1983 assassination of Dr. Issam Ali Sartawi, the last and most vocal of Arafat's doves, in Portugal where he was attending the Socialist International Conference. Sartawi's assassination, completed the break with the constituency, and precipitated a temporary decline in ANO violence. The ANO was now the pariah faction of the PLO.

Amid rumors that ANO was defunct, Abu Nidal responded with a series of interviews that initiated a new campaign of terror that targeted the international community. In one interview, Abu Nidal threatened British and American leaders and identified his enemy as:

...the Zionist occupation force of my homeland Palestine. My enemy is imperialism in all its forms. My enemy is the dismemberment and the fragmented state of my Arab nation. My enemies are the slovenly and chaotic state of our Arab society, as well as the suppression and seduction of our young generation;

Additionally, he described his dream as "a united Arab nation living in freedom, justice, and equality." He finally justified his use of violence as the means to implement his dream:

...The fact that the Zionists have taken by force part of my Arab homeland is, for me, a crime. For me it would be a crime if we permitted the Zionists to leave our

¹⁶⁶Quoted in Seale, *Abu Nidal*, 165.

homeland alive. That is my philosophy. I, Abu Nidal, consider myself the answer to the misfortune of the Arabs.¹⁶⁷

As a consequence, ANO began a campaign which targeted governments and individuals perceived as having an association with Israel, a campaign which rapidly spiralled upward.

Although beyond the level of acceptable violence, ANO was able to continue their campaign because of the availability of state sponsorship. Although ostensibly under Syrian sponsorship, this campaign was conducted with Libyan support. Seale notes that Abu Nidal's objectives were to embarrass the Syrians making the ANO's move to Libya seem plausible, reverse a reformist trend within ANO elements in Lebanon, and regain control of the organization.¹⁶⁸ The result was a crescendo of indiscriminant violence that began in late 1984 and continued into mid-1986.

D. LIMITATION

ANO reached limitation in late 1985, with their violence culminating in near simultaneous attacks on the El Al check-in desks at the Rome and Vienna airports. In Rome, 17 people were killed and 68 wounded; three terrorists were killed and one captured. In Vienna, one person was killed and 33 wounded; two terrorists were killed

¹⁶⁷Abu Nidal. Interview. Hamburg *Der Spiegel*, 14 October 1985, FBIS Middle East and Africa, 18 October 1985, A3. As an aside, not only did he consider himself to be the answer to Arab misfortune, he saw himself as the leader and heir of the reincarnation of the Qarmatian movement of the eighth century Abbassid dynasty. Melman, "Master Terrorist," 77 notes that the Qarmatians regarded indiscriminate terror as the means to happiness. Abu Nidal brought this cult of violence into the future and magnified it through the lens of modern technology.

¹⁶⁸Seale, *Abu Nidal*, 229.

and one captured. The final act of violence of this phase was the fitting end to a trend that began in 1979: violent, international, and indiscriminant.

E. DECLINE

The ANO was in decline by mid-1986. This phase was characterized by decreasing frequency of operations, continuing high quality tactics (armed attacks, bombings, assassinations), declining target value (PLO and internal), declining location value (Lebanon), and declining indiscriminance (point targets and controlled destruction). Several factors precipitated ANO's decline.

First, the nature of ANO's sponsorship changed. Yishay observes that Libya by 1987 had reduced the scope of its support for international terrorism as a result of policies initiated by the United States, Great Britain and France, and the affect of the ongoing conflict between Libya and Chad.¹⁶⁹ This sponsorship withdrawal was solidified by the United States' bombing of Libya in April 1986.

Second, In April 1987, Abu Jihad, then PLO operations chief, met with Abu Nidal prior to the Eighteenth Palestinian National Congress to discuss the possibility of ANO's return to the fold.¹⁷⁰ Abu Jihad insisted that before ANO could do so, they must abide by all PLO resolutions and demonstrate its commitment by limiting all violent activities for a year. Abu Nidal agreed.

¹⁶⁹Ron Ben Yishay, "The New Lords of Terror," Tel Aviv *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 15 DEC 1989, JPRS-TOT-90-011-L, 23 Mar 1990, 3.

¹⁷⁰"Activities of Abu Nidal Organization Reviewed," Jerusalem *Al-Bayadir Al-Siyasi*, 16 DEC 1989, JPRS-TOT-90-004-L, 30 JAN 1990, 13-14.

Third, a consequence of this inactivity was a dispute in the ANO between moderate elements who advocated a more political line and extremists who recommended that immediate action. This dispute was the main issue of the February 1988 ANO general conference in Tehran. The perception that Abu Nidal was losing control of his organization resulted in the fourth factor.

Fourth, in order to regain control of the ANO, Abu Nidal implemented a widespread purge between November 1987 and late 1988. In this purge between 150-600 ANO members, constituting one-third to one-half of the total membership, mostly young men in their early twenties, were reported to have been killed.¹⁷¹ Abd al-Rahman Isa, former ANO spokesman who defected in October 1989, reported that the top ANO leaders killed were "lured to Abu Nidal's house near Tripoli on the pretext of discussing policy matters, taken by surprise and killed in the house. Then they were buried right there. Abu Nidal and his hirelings poured the cement over their bodies themselves."¹⁷² This purge, in turn, precipitated a fifth factor.

Fifth, as a result of the purge, fragmentation occurred within the ANO. In response to the purge,¹⁷³ Atif Abu Bakr and Abu Isa, both former senior ANO leaders, defected in August and October 1989, respectively. In October, Abu Isa issued a statement which

¹⁷¹JPRS Terrorism reports tend toward the lower end of this range; Seale, *Abu Nidal*, 288, reports 600.

¹⁷²Quoted in Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Arabs Say Deadly Power Struggle Has Split Abu Nidal Terror Group," *New York Times*, 12 November 1989, A1/A26,

¹⁷³Specifically to the murder of former ANO deputy chief Abu Nizar.

detailed executions and random killings "committed by Abu Nidal against hundreds of the organizations leaders and cadres," established the roots of the crisis with Abu Nidal's perceived loss of control beginning in 1984, and called for a public trial of Abu Nidal.¹⁷⁴

In November 1989, Abu Isa and Abu Bakr issued a joint communique which announced the formation of an Emergency Leadership with the aim of taking control of the ANO and declaring:

Our martyrs fell in the wrong wars. The operations of Rome, Vienna, Sudan, Athens, Paris, and Karachi were senseless and did us immense harm. Our martyrs should have fought in Palestine, but Abu Nidal turned his back on the just struggle. We will never compromise with a butcher whose hands are stained with the blood of our brothers.¹⁷⁵

At least one other breakaway faction, the Fatah Revolutionary Council, First Region, Martyr Abu-'Ali Iyad Organization, formed by early 1991.¹⁷⁶

As noted, terrorist groups in decline are at their most dangerous. To recapture the headlines, such a group must act and act violently. ANO was no exception. In May and July 1988, ANO made two such attempts. In the first, a 5-man ANO attacked two targets in Khartoum-the Sudan Club, reserved for British and Commonwealth citizens, which was machine gunned; and the Akrople Hotel in which a rucksack of grenades was tossed into the restaurant. In the second, another 5-man team conducted a grenade and machine gun

¹⁷⁴Abu al-Rahman 'Isa. "Abu Nidal's Crimes," Interview in London *Al-Dustur*, 6 NOV 1989, JPRS-TOT-90-001-L, 3 JAN 1990, 4-5.

¹⁷⁵Quoted in Seale, *Abu Nidal*, 310.

¹⁷⁶"Abu-Nidal Dissenters Appeal to Libya," London *Al-Hayah*, 9 May 1993, JPRS-TOT-92-020-L, 21 May 1993.

attack on a Greek cruise liner, *City of Poros*, killing nine and wounding eighty passengers. Although Seale explains these attacks as intended to undermine the *Intifada*, an alternative explanation would suggest that they were attempts to reestablish ANO influence after the purges.¹⁷⁷

Since 1990, ANO and PLO have been involved in an ongoing battle over control of the refugee camps in southern Lebanon.¹⁷⁸ ANO's focus, consequently, has been inward instead of outward. In addition, reports indicate that ANO shifted its organization from Libya to Sudan in 1992,¹⁷⁹ another possible reason for the lack of external activity.

F. EXTINCTION

This battle of the camps is illustrative of potentially effective use of action against a terrorist group. In these refugee camps the PLO; e.g., Fatah, was the *de facto* government. In a sense, their actions against the ANO constituted counterterrorism. The basic rule for both organizations was a tit-for-tat strategy against each other. When the ANO assassinated a Fatah member, an ANO member was assassinated in return. When

¹⁷⁷Seale, *Abu Nidal*, 262-67.

¹⁷⁸"LOW Missiles Stalk Fatah Leaders in Camps in Lebanon; Diary of the Silenced-Pistols War-From the Secret Documents of the Abu Nidal Struggle" Paris *Al-Watan Al'Arabi*, 16 October 1992, JPRS-TOT-92-043-L, 14 December 1992, 17-25; and "The Battle of the Camps Anticipates the Question of Palestinian Presence in Lebanon," Paris *Al-Watan Al'Arabi*, 14 September 1990, JPRS-TOT-90-037-L, 29 October 1990, 14-15

¹⁷⁹"Sabri al-Banna Expelled From Libya, Heading For Iraq," Cairo *Mena*, 21 APR 1992, JPRS-TOT-92-015L, 27 APR 1992.

a Fatah camp was attacked, an ANO camp was attacked in return.¹⁸⁰ By 1990, this strategy coupled with ANO internal problems, broke their attempt at recovery and moved them toward effective extinction.

One of the conditions for regeneration mentioned previously; e.g., changes in the sociopolitical environment, occurred twice since 1990. The first, Desert Shield/Storm, did not result in a significant increase in ANO violence. ANO's major response, the assassination of Abu Iyad, although significant to the PLO, was only a single event. The second sociopolitical change, the peace dialog between the PLO and Israel, to date has not elicited a response from the ANO. This, however, is the type of change that could catalyze a regeneration.

¹⁸⁰"LOW missiles Stalk," 17-25; and "Battle of the Camps," 14-15.

XI. GERMANY - RED ARMY FACTION (RAF)

The RAF's life cycle is presented as Figure 10.




Figure 10. RAF Life Cycle.

A. FORMATION

The RAF formed from the political and social disequilibrium that characterized post-World War II Germany's drive toward reconstruction.¹⁸¹ This environment left little room for social change, a fact with which many West Germans, especially their youth, took

¹⁸¹For thorough discussion of the roots of the RAF, see Becker, *Hitler's Children*, 21-62; Schura Cook, "Germany: From Protest to Terrorism," in *Terrorism in Europe*, ed., Y. Alexander and K. A. Myers, (London: Croom Helm, 1982.); and Konrad Kellan, "Ideology and Rebellion: Terrorism in West Germany," in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed., W. Reich, Woodrow Wilson Center Series, (New York: Cambridge University Press and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1990), 43-58.

exception. The immediate cause of the RAF, however, was radicalization of the German student movement of the 1960's. Cook argues that the shift to terrorism occurred in part because of government reaction to student protest.¹⁸² The wounding of student leader Rudi Dutschke on 11 April 1968 and death of student Benno Ohnesorg on 2 June 1968 by the police was the precipitant that caused many to turn to violence. Baumann described his feelings at Ohnesorg's funeral:

When the coffin went by it made click...something went off...this bullet was also meant against you...who shot did not matter a shit...it became clear to me, now is the time to act, don't show any mercy...at this point, I understood the meaning of terrorism...this insight gave me a real strength, a real high.¹⁸³

As noted by Kellan, this terrorism, once started, assumed a life and momentum of its own.¹⁸⁴

The RAF is unusual because of its multiple generations of terrorists and multiple waves of violence. Pluchinsky identifies three generations of RAF violence: Baader-Meinhof Gang, 1970-72, Second Generation under leadership of Brigitte Mohnhaupt and Christian Klar, 1974-82, and Third Generation under leadership of Barbara and Horst Meyer, 1983-92.¹⁸⁵ Each generation can be characterized by its strategic goals and levels

¹⁸²Cook, "From Protest to Terrorism," 155-64.

¹⁸³Quoted in Ibid., 162.

¹⁸⁴Kellan, "Ideology and Rebellion," 47.

¹⁸⁵Pluchinsky, "Organizational and Operational Analysis," 46-49.

of violence. Although each generation can be considered separately, the RAF's life cycle can also be taken as a product of each generation building on the others.

Perhaps the most significant reason for the RAF's longevity and ability to survive across generations was the group's sensitivity to the importance of its constituency. The RAF's initial constituency came from radicalized members of largely student communes. Later it appealed to a broader section of society, gaining their constituency from Germany's political left. Most importantly, the RAF managed to maintain a solid core of sympathizers across its existence.

Neidhardt considers the reason for RAF viability was the efficiency of their "organized social infrastructure of preparatory and supporting networks, groups, and organizations functioning as intermediate linkages."¹⁸⁶ Pluchinsky notes that this support, which extended across European boundaries, allowed the RAF to reorganize after the capture of leaders.¹⁸⁷ This relationship with its constituency was not perfect, however, as support was withheld on occasion in response to RAF violence.

B. BAADER-MEINHOF GENERATION

Each generation began with a preparation phase and each generation laid the groundwork for the next. The RAF was born with the breakout from prison of Andreas Baader by Ulrike Meinhof, Ingrid Schubert, Irene Goergens, and Hans-Jurgen Baacker.

¹⁸⁶Friedhelm Neidhardt, "Left-Wing and Right-Wing Terrorist Groups: A Comparison for the German Case," in *International Social Movement Research*, v.4, ed., D. della Porta, (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1992), 234.

¹⁸⁷Pluchinsky, "Organizational and Operational Analysis," 44.

These five, plus Horst Mahler and Jan-Carl Raspe, formed the core of the original RAF-BMG. When asked why Baader was released, Meinhof replied:

You could say there were three reasons. First, of course, because Andreas Baader is cadre. And because among those who have now grasped what must be done, and what is right, we can't afford the luxury of assuming we can dispense with certain individuals. Second, we freed a prisoner as our first action because we believe that the people whom we want to show what politics is all about today are the kind who will have no difficulty in identifying with the freeing of a prisoner themselves. Third, another reason we began by freeing a prisoner was to make it quite clear that we mean business.¹⁸⁸

As the group was born with a prison break, this concern for imprisoned comrades dominated their violence for years.

Cooperation affected the RAF-BMG in its early phases as the core spent the summer of 1970 at a PFLP training camp in Jordon. Of this training RAF member Horst Mahler concluded in an article written after his capture, "a fighting group can only exist through struggle itself. All attempts to organize and train a group outside real conditions lead to ridiculous results, often with tragic consequences."¹⁸⁹ The RAF-BMG returned from this training ready to begin their campaign of violence.

To do so, however, required logistics actions. The RAF-BMG's preparation phase, 1970-72, consisted of increasing frequency of actions, low quality tactics, low value targets, low value locations, and low indiscriminance. Their primary focus during this phase was to obtain the finances, arms and ammunition, and develop the infrastructure to

¹⁸⁸Quoted in Aust, *Baader-Meinhof Group*, 16,

¹⁸⁹Quoted in Hans Josef Horchem, "Terrorism in West Germany," *Conflict Studies*, v. 186, (London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, May 1986), 11

support a campaign of terrorism. To this end, the RAF went on a bank robbing spree that netted more than DM 1.2 million.¹⁹⁰

Also during this phase, Meinhof and Mahler released three strategic documents that provided the political motivation and justification for German terrorists, not just the RAF.¹⁹¹ These documents rejected legal methods and urged the use of violence as the only means of changing society. In addition they provided instructions for manufacturing armaments and forming commandos. The name "Red Army" was first used here.¹⁹²

As early as December 1970, quarrels between Baader and Meinhof created tensions within the group. Meinhof argued that their lack of strategic direction and rash of arrests could be attributed to incorrect conduct of the group and poor planning. Baader argued that the causes were individual. Aust described their argument:

'Now that were all together,' said Ulrike Meinhof, 'we might as well try discussing the whole thing. If we're not getting anywhere, then we must have made mistakes.' 'Well, of course there've been mistakes. But made by individuals, not the group. So it's individuals and not the group who have to change,' replied Baader, his voice rising. Ulrike Meinhof's own voice rose. 'All this disorganized running about, chasing hither and thither - things don't work out here, let's move on to the next town. We never stop to think why something went wrong.'¹⁹³

¹⁹⁰Hans Josef Horchem, "Learning the Lessons of Counter-Terror: West Germany's Experience," *Defense & Foreign Affairs Digest*, July 1979, 20.

¹⁹¹Hans Josef Horchem, "West Germany's Red Army Anarchists," in *Contemporary Terrorism*, ed., W. Gutteridge, (London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1986), 206-08; and Becker, *Hitler's Children*, 232-34.

¹⁹²These documents were: "The Urban Guerrilla Concept," April 1971; "Close the Gaps of Revolutionary Theory: Build Up the Red Army!," June 1971; and "Urban Guerrillas and Class Struggle," April 1972.

¹⁹³Quoted in Aust, *Baader-Meinhof Group*, 131.

By early 1972, just prior to the onset of their bombing campaign, these tensions led to group fragmentation as Meinhof went north, and Baader went south.

The RAF-BMG growth phase culminated in 14 days in May 1972 and consisted of high frequency of actions, high quality tactics, high value targets, low value locations, and high indiscriminance. Between 11 May and 24 May, the RAF bombed six separate locations with 12 bombs which wounded 60 individuals, killed four, and resulted in millions of dollars damage. Two bombings targeted US military facilities, three targeted the German judicial and police system, and one targeted a publishing company.

This violence spiraled rapidly beyond the ALOV, exceeding their constituency's ability to adapt. Support was withdrawn, limitation was reached, and the group crashed into decline as their own constituency informed on them.¹⁹⁴ In addition, the government's reaction was an extremely effective blend of restraint coupled with decisive action. Andreas Baader and Jan-Carl Raspe, consequently, were arrested in Frankfurt on 1 June; Gudrun Ensslin in Hamburg on 8 June; and Ulrike Meinhof and Gerhard Muller in Hannover on 15 June. The RAF should have ceased to be with these arrests.

B. SECOND GENERATION

Once this leadership was in prison, however, the actions of the German government managed to reconstitute the RAF's constituency. The RAF, through their lawyers and remaining supporters, used publicity to better advantage than did the government. The RAF publicized their alleged prison conditions and "isolation torture," turned their trial

¹⁹⁴Baumann, *Terror or Love?*, 19.

into a sham, and made strategic use of hunger strikes. During one of these hunger strikes, on 9 November 1974, Holger Meins died in his prison cell.

As with Ohnesorg, Meins' death precipitated more violence. Speitel described his feelings:

I was for the first time personally struck by the situation of the prisoners. I really saw tortured and tormented prisoners, in their totally isolated cells, where they wanted to destroy them slowly by means of scientific methods...Then came the day when Holger Meins died...For us his death was a key experience...The death of Holger Meins and the decision to take arms were one and the same decision. Reflection was not possible anymore. It was only the emotional pressure of the last few months which pushed us to react.¹⁹⁵

Aust concluded that Meins' death gave the RAF a tremendous boost:

Once in prison, the group developed a political stature they had previously lacked. The larger-than-life security precautions endowed the prisoners with a political significance they had never come near achieving with their writings and actions. Between 1970 and 1972, the police had been looking for some forty people. Now, at the end of 1974, they were hunting three hundred. Criminal Investigation Office experts estimated that what was described as 'the sympathesizers' scene' numbered over ten thousand. The definition of a 'sympathesizer' was becoming wider and wider.¹⁹⁶

For the next 20 years, its constituency nurtured the RAF during rebuilding periods and supported them during violent periods. In a sense, the German government played a pivotal role in recreating an enemy which it had already defeated.

After a reorganization and preparation period, 1973-74, the first terrorist action of the RAF Second Generation occurred when the "Holger Meins Commando," in

¹⁹⁵della Porta, "Political Socialization," 273.

¹⁹⁶Aust, *Baader-Meinhof Group*, 273.

cooperation with members of the German SPK,¹⁹⁷ took over the West German Embassy in Stockholm on 24 April 1975. The terrorists held the Embassy for 12 hours, demanding the release of 40 RAF political prisoners.

This action, which focussed on the release of the RAF's historical leadership, was typical of early Second Generation operations. The quintessential operation of this type was the Scheyler kidnapping in September 1977. This generation's early violence was characterized by low frequency, high quality tactics, low to medium value targets, low value location (other than the embassy takeover), and high indiscriminance.

Under the leadership of Brigitte Mohnhaupt and Christian Klar, RAF violence increased during the latter part of the Second Generation. Pluchinsky argues that their violence increased as a result of two factors that induced strategic change.¹⁹⁸ First, the death or suicide of the entire historical leadership by the end of 1977 allowed a shift from prisoner-release violence to sociorevolutionary violence. Second, the death of the imprisoned leadership dealt the RAF a psychological blow. One ex-member stated that "when the prisoners were dead, a world collapsed...after that, resignation and despair took over."¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁷The Socialist Patients' Collective (SPK) was formed by Dr. Wolfgang Huber and his group therapy patients at the Psychiatric-Neurological Clinic of Heidelberg University to protest management of the clinic. The RAF and SPK merged by July 1971. See Becker, *Hitler's Children*, 227-31

¹⁹⁸Pluchinsky, "Organizational and Operational Analysis," 47.

¹⁹⁹Quoted in *Ibid.*, 47.

This resignation resulted internal tensions and loss of direction between 1978 and 1979. Pluchinsky notes that the RAF used this period to increase interaction and involvement of the various levels of their infrastructure, and to reestablish strategic direction.²⁰⁰ This new strategic direction appeared in a May 1982 document, "Guerrilla Warfare, the Resistance, and the Anti-Imperialist Front" and included the genesis of a united terrorist front in Europe.

The first inklings of this new direction, which focussed on US and NATO targets, came toward the end of the Second Generation's activity. In June 1979, the RAF attempted to assassinate NATO Commander-in-Chief GEN Alexander Haig. In September 1981, the RAF attempted to assassinate the Commander of US Army Forces in Europe GEN Frederick Kroesen. The Second Generation's violence, however, was cut short when Mohnhaupt and Klar were captured in November 1982, along with a significant number of the RAF's arms caches.

C. THIRD GENERATION

These arrests put the RAF into another rebuilding period in which their constituency kept the group safe underground. The RAF exited this period on 18 December 1984 with a bombing at a NATO school at Oberammergau. This first action of the Third Generation began a series of increasingly violent acts -increasing frequency of actions, high quality tactics, high value targets, low value locations, and medium indiscriminance - which

²⁰⁰Ibid., 47.

followed the strategic direction of the Second Generation. The Third Generation continued this line of violence until they reached limitation.

The year 1985 proved to be critical to the RAF. In January, the RAF and French Action Directe (DA) released a communique announcing the formation of an anti-imperialist front.²⁰¹ On 8 August, the RAF/DA conducted a joint operation when they detonated a car bomb on the USAF base at Rhein-Mein, an action which moved the RAF beyond the ALOV. The evening prior to the bombing, the RAF killed a US soldier for his identity card. This murder was severely criticized by the RAF constituency and other European militant groups. Pluchinsky notes that their constituency might have accepted the killing had the RAF explained it with the proper political strategic perspective, rather than as a means of gaining access to the base.²⁰²

This action precipitated an eleven month lull in violence, resulted in a strategic change, and may have put the RAF into decline. The strategy change became apparent with the RAF's next action in which Dr. Karl-Heinz Beckurts, Siemens electronics

²⁰¹This communique is reprinted in Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky, *Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations*, (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 65-67.

²⁰²Pluchinsky, "Organizational and Operational Analysis," 68n.

company board member, was assassinated with a remotely detonated bomb.²⁰³ From this point, the RAF resumed targeting of the German government and German "capitalism."²⁰⁴

After a 23 month rebuilding period, violence began to increase once again, and possibly for the last time. This period was characterized by increasing frequency of action, high quality tactics, low value targets, low value location, and medium to high indiscriminance. This period began on 20 September 1988 with an assassination attempt against Dr. Hans Tietmeyer, a Ministry of Finance State Secretary, and continued through successive assassinations and attempts against Alfred Herrhausen, chairman of Deutsche Bank, on 30 November 1989; Hans Neusel, internal security secretary, on 27 July 1990; and Detlev Rohwedder, president of Treuhandanstalt on 1 April 1991.

These actions ended significant RAF violence. In April and June 1992, the RAF released communiques announcing their willingness to suspend conditionally their violence, in effect declaring a cease-fire. Pluchinsky argues that these communiques mark the end of the RAF as a viable terrorist group.²⁰⁵ To date, the RAF have not proved him to be wrong.

²⁰³Ibid., 68-69. This was the RAF's first use of remote detonation, a tactical increase in violence made possible by technology.

²⁰⁴Ibid, 70 and 76. Two minor exceptions were the unconfirmed RAF involvement in the bombing of a disco frequented by US servicemen in Rota, Spain on 17 June 1988, and a small arms strafing attack against the US Embassy in Bonn on 13 February 1991.

²⁰⁵Dennis A. Pluchinsky, "Germany's Red Army Faction: An Obituary, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, v. 16, 1993, 135-57. The two communiques are provided in their entirety.

As an aside and still under debate is the possibility that the RAF received some level of support from the East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi/secret police). Reports in West German press began to appear in 1990 of GDR involvement in RAF training, planning, coordination with other terrorist groups, and most importantly in providing safehaven.²⁰⁶ RAF member Susan Albrect, for example, was living in East Berlin when she was arrested by West German authorities in June 1991.²⁰⁷ Of importance to this thesis is the potential impact of this "sponsorship" on the RAF, especially during its rebuilding periods.

²⁰⁶Pluchinsky, "Organizational and Operational Analysis," 81n notes that RAF member Inge Vielt made these allegations after her arrest in the GDR in June 1990.

²⁰⁷Martin, "Accidental Terrorist," 44-51.

XII. IS THE THEORY VALID?

Do the case studies validate all or portions of the theory developed above? Does a change in precedence from strategic to organizational goals influence a terrorist group's behavior? Does that changing behavior affect the terrorist group's violence? Does this new behavior influence its survival? This part considers these questions by applying the case study analysis to the five hypotheses presented above.

A. HYPOTHESIS 1

Hypothesis 1 is generally supported by the case studies. External pressures and internal tensions do influence the rise of a terrorist group's actual violence. Contagion, in one form or another, was experienced by each terrorist group. In general, the rise of each group's violence can be associated with the worldwide rise of extremist violence in the late 1950's and early 1960's, with the RAF and FLQ looking to US and Palestinian groups, and each group looking to the MLN. In particular, MLN and FLQ diplomatic kidnapping can be linked to each other and similar cases in Dominican Republic, Argentina, and Brazil. Cooperation aided each group to some extent, the best examples of which were RAF training with the PFLP, and joint operations with Action Directe. Competition affected each group, with ANO/PLO and MLN/OPR-33 providing the best examples.

The internal climate of each group was tense. MLN and FLQ decisions to kill their kidnapping victims was influenced by internal tensions. Similar tensions caused dissention and fragmentation within the ANO and RAF, which were partially responsible for increases in their actual violence. For the RAF in particular, such tensions are documented across their life cycle. In each case, external pressures and internal tensions were associated with increases in the terrorist group's actual violence.

B. HYPOTHESIS 2

Hypothesis 2 is generally supported by the case studies. Although MLOV is conceptual in nature and difficult to measure, the data suggests that once a certain level of violence was achieved, each terrorist group tended to maintain a least that level until forced into decline. For example, the ANO formed as a fragment of the PLO at a time when the PLO was shifting from armed to political resistance. The ANO, consequently, entered the terrorist game at a relatively high level, a level which it maintained until forced into decline. Similarly, the RAF's Third Generation attempted to maintain the strategic direction and associated level of violence set by the Second Generation. One can conclude that the level of sustained by each group determined its MLOV.

C. HYPOTHESIS 3

Hypothesis 3 is generally supported by the case studies. As with MLOV, ALOV is conceptual and difficult to define operationally. In each case, however, a significant increase in each group's violence from their normal modus operandi, resulted in withdrawal of constituency support. For the MLN, their diplomatic kidnapping campaign

and then execution of one of the victims, was a marked increase in violence over their normal domestic methods. Similarly, the FLQ kidnapping was the first of its kind in North America and was coupled with a subsequent execution of one of the victims. For the ANO, their shift in targeting to the international community in Europe compounded their campaign against PLO moderates. For the RAF, the BMG's 14 day bombing campaign was a marked increase in violence over their previous bank robberies. In addition, the RAF Second Generation's murder of an individual for identity papers was an outrage to its constituency. In each case, the constituency's reaction was negative, as physical, psychological or political support was withdrawn or withheld.

D. HYPOTHESIS 4

Hypothesis 4 is only partially supported by the case studies. Withdrawal of constituency support was a necessary but not always sufficient condition for a decrease in terrorist group violence. For the FLQ, withdrawal of constituency support did cause a decline in their violence. For the MLN, their violence, after a temporary decrease, continued to increase as a function of resource availability and government action. For the ANO, state sponsorship provided for acceleration of their violence after a constituency backlash. For the RAF, a solid core of supporters, government action, and possible state sponsorship protected the group during rebuilding periods and allowed for multiple generations of violence. In each case, however, a significant constituency backlash in which support was withdrawn or withheld caused some decrease in the terrorist group's actual violence.

E. HYPOTHESIS 5

Hypothesis 5 is generally supported by the case studies. In each case, once support and resources were no longer available, the terrorist group's violence decreased. As it dropped below MLOV, fragmentation occurred as membership withdrew and influence waned. The ANO and FLQ cases are particularly good examples. For the ANO, once their sponsorship was withdrawn, a sharp decrease in their violence occurred. Soon afterward internal dissention appeared, and marked lines formed between moderate and extremist strategies. This dissention resulted in a major purge, defection of key leadership, and internal war. For the FLQ, fragmentation occurred as key leaders, joined by many of the members, dropped out and entered legal political opposition movements.

All things being equal, the theory developed in this thesis is valid. As organizational issues take priority over instrumental ones, terrorism becomes self-defeating and survival threatening for the terrorist group. Since this priority shift occurs as a natural consequence of their internal dynamics, the seeds of a terrorist group's destruction exist within the group itself. To this point, however, this thesis has focussed on analysis of the terrorist group itself, while ignoring the interactions that take place between the group and external influences. From the case studies, one concludes that factors external to the terrorist group can suppress the germination of its seeds of destruction and allow the group to survive. The next section considers the nature of the influence of those factors on a terrorist group's life cycle.

XIII. THE GOVERNMENT DILEMMA

Terrorist groups exist on the horns of a dilemma. First, a terrorist group cannot decrease its actual violence. As its actual violence drops below MLOV, maintenance suffers, influence wanes, and survival is jeopardized. Second, a terrorist group cannot maintain its actual violence at a constant level. As violence becomes routinized, a terrorist group must increase its actual violence at an increasing rate to maintain themselves and their influence at a constant level.

Third, a terrorist group's violence must increase; external pressures and internal tensions reinforce that increase. A terrorist group, however, can increase its actual violence, but only at its own peril. All things being equal, as actual violence increases beyond the ALOV, the terrorist group's relationship with its constituency is damaged, support is withdrawn, and survival is jeopardized.

There is an apparent paradox in this dilemma. One side of the paradox concludes that the seeds of a terrorist group's destruction exist within the group. One need only be patient and a terrorist group will destroy itself as their violence exceeds the ALOV. The other side of the paradox observes that this self-destruction is not always realized. In some cases, terrorist groups survive and operate beyond the ALOV. The purpose of this section is to consider those factors, as identified in the case studies, which provide for terrorist group survival after a withdrawal of constituency support.

A. RESOURCE AVAILABILITY

As organizational behavior begins to dominate, the terrorist group becomes more concerned with survival, and less concerned with its constituency's needs. As this occurs, violence becomes an end in itself. Crenshaw argues that in such situations the terrorist group jeopardizes its legitimacy in the eyes of its constituency and is doomed to fail.²⁰⁸ Post notes that terrorist groups on the brink of failure are at its most dangerous and, if given the resources, will attempt a dramatic increase in violence to regain legitimacy.²⁰⁹

One potential source of resources is the terrorist group itself. Terrorist groups tend to stockpile. Pluchinsky notes that the arrests of RAF leaders Mohnhaupt and Klar in November 1981 led to the discovery of 13 caches throughout West Germany that contained handguns, machine pistols, hand grenades, dynamite, forged passports, drivers' licenses, car registration papers, US military identification, money, and target lists.²¹⁰ Similarly, Seale found that much of the ANO's efforts between 1973 and 1975 focussed on establishment of weapons and ammunition dumps in Europe.²¹¹ Seale also speculates that Abu Nidal netted over \$50 million in extortion operations between 1976 and 1988.²¹²

²⁰⁸Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," 87.

²⁰⁹Post, "Group and Organizational Dynamics," 314.

²¹⁰Pluchinsky, "Organizational and Operational Analysis," 65.

²¹¹Seale, *Abu Nidal*, 105.

²¹²*Ibid.*, 204.

With such internal resources a terrorist group could continue operations above the ALOV in the wake of a withdrawal of support by its constituency. These resources, however, are limited. Unless it develops some mechanism of replenishment, the terrorist group's organizational requirements will rapidly exceed its resources. With the loss of constituency support, such mechanisms become difficult, if not impossible. The result is a rapid decline once these internal resources are depleted.

Another source of resources is provided through sponsorship of states or other terrorist groups. In the case of state sponsorship, finances, weapons, documentation, and most importantly security are readily available. The underground lifestyle becomes non-existent within the confines of the sponsoring state. The ANO thrived on such support, passing from Iraq to Syria to Libya over its 20 year life span. Similarly, East German support may have provided the RAF with the ability to "regenerate." Sponsorship from other terrorist groups is more limited, but can make finances, weapons, ammunition, etc. available.

Sponsorship, however, is a three-headed medusa. One head provides the resources. Another often extracts tremendous costs. For example, ANO's spiralling violence against the international community in Europe arguably was due in part to Libyan sponsorship. The ANO began these operations at a time when internal tensions were high and their constituency was alienated as a result of their campaign against PLO moderates. This campaign solidified the break with their constituency and led to decline.

The medusa's final head withdraws the support. Sponsorship, especially from a state, is tenuous at best. The sponsoring state is subject to full reprisals of the international system. Economic sanctions are the norm and military action is not unknown for states identified as terrorist sponsors. Changes in either the domestic or international environment may turn a terrorist group into a political liability to its sponsor. As Abu Nidal could attest, the terrorist group quickly finds itself on the curbside with the door to home locked tight.

The problem for the terrorist group in cases where resources remain available beyond the ALOV is that continuing violence widens the gulf between the group and the constituency. When those resources are depleted or sponsorship is withdrawn, the terrorist group has nowhere to turn. In such a situation, its decline is immediate and catastrophic. The possibility of recovery, regardless of the scope of societal change, is remote.

This argument develops a hypothesis and a corollary to that hypothesis:

Hypothesis 6. *If resources remain available, then a terrorist group can survive beyond ALOV.*

Corollary 1. *If violence continues beyond the ALOV and resources are depleted or withdrawn, then the terrorist group's decline is immediate and catastrophic.*

In general, the case studies validate this hypothesis and its corollary. When the ANO exceeded the ALOV in 1983 with their campaign against PLO moderates, a constituency backlash resulted and support was withdrawn. ANO violence decreased temporarily in 1984, and then spiralled to new heights in 1985 as a result of Libyan

sponsorship. When this sponsorship was withdrawn in 1986 as a result of Libyan attempts at moderation and US bombing, the ANO came crashing down.

Similarly, East German sponsorship may have been a partial reason behind RAF longevity. As the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, so fell the RAF in 1992. For the MLN, resources remained available after Mitrone's execution in 1970, allowing increased violence until 1971. Resource depletion coupled with more effective government action resulted in their rapid decline and effective extinction by the end of 1972.

B. GOVERNMENT ACTION

The government exists on the horns of a dilemma. On one, the government must act to suppress the terrorist group in order to retain their legitimacy. On the other, if the government acts too violently, then they run the risk of jeopardizing their legitimacy. Perhaps the most significant factor that allows terrorist groups to survive beyond the ALOV is government action which is excessive and inappropriate for the situation.

The government, in their effort to combat the terrorist group, faces problems similar to the terrorist group's. First, the government is influenced by a constituency. One level of government constituency concerns international pressures placed on a government to contain the terrorist group within their borders. Other states have no desire for the contagious and cooperative effects of terrorism to allow its spread to extremist elements within its borders.

Another level of government constituency concerns the vast majority of society that is terrorized by the terrorist group. The beauty of terrorism as a means of influence is

that anyone or anything may be a symbolic target. As the terrorist group's violence becomes more indiscriminant, society becomes a target as a coincidence of their proximity to an action. Typically, bombings are not selective. The government's constituency, consequently, exerts extreme pressure on the government to act or risk losing its legitimacy.

The government, as a result of pressures from its constituency, have minimum and acceptable levels of violence associated with efforts to combat the terrorist group. The government's minimum level of violence is that level at which the government is perceived by their constituency as doing something about the terrorist group. Below the minimum level, the government is perceived as being weak and ineffective, and lacking credibility. The legitimacy of the government is questioned. A government in such a situation faces internal tensions and decision making problems similar to the terrorist group's. The tensions and problems coupled with constituency pressures cause the government to escalate its level of activity against the terrorist group.

Government counterterrorist violence can increase and remain effective until its acceptable level of violence is reached. The government's acceptable level of violence is that level at which the violence is considered excessive and inappropriate for the situation. Above this level, the government ignores constitutional rights and is perceived as being repressive and illegitimate.

The terrorist group's strategic goal is to influence the government into repressive actions that raises government violence above its acceptable level. Knutson notes that

terrorist groups can count on "inappropriately rapid and inappropriately heavy countermeasures" once their threat exceeds a minimum level.²¹³ These countermeasures reconstitute the terrorist group's constituency, raise the ALOV, and allow increasing terrorist group actual violence.

The terrorist group's violence has a similar effect on the government's acceptable level. As a terrorist group's actual violence increases, an increase in the government's acceptable level occurs in response. The government's constituency accepts a higher level of violence as necessary to combat the terrorist group's increasing violence.

The result is an escalating cycle of violence and counterviolence over time. The government has two strategic goals in this situation. The first is to maintain its acceptable level of violence above the terrorist group's ALOV. This can be accomplished by efforts focussed on its constituency that raise its acceptable level, and on the terrorist group's constituency that lower its ALOV. The second is to ensure that its acceptable level is not approached until after the terrorist group exceeds their ALOV. This provides the government with an opportunity of legitimately responding in like kind to the terrorist group's violence.

This argument develops a hypothesis and a corollary to that hypothesis:

Hypothesis 7. *If government action is excessive and inappropriate for the situation, then the terrorist group's constituency reconstitutes and its ALOV increases.*

²¹³Knutson, "The Terrorists' Dilemmas," 203.

Corollary 2. *If government action is correct in timing and method, then the terrorist group is forced into an immediate and catastrophic decline.*

In general, the case studies validate this hypothesis and corollary. The MLN exceeded its ALOV between July 1970 and January 1971 during its diplomatic kidnapping campaign. Two days after Mitrone's execution on 9 August, the Uruguayan General Legislative Assembly voted to suspend personal guarantees for 20 days. This suspension led to a campaign of police raids in which 7,168 homes were claimed to have been searched by the end of the year. Similarly, after Jackson's kidnapping on 8 January, personal liberties were suspended for 40 days, initiating a police campaign of house-to-house searches throughout Montevideo.

Although the timing of the government action was correct; e.g., the MLN was above ALOV, the excessive methods and inappropriateness of the suspension of personal rights, reconstituted the MLN constituency to some extent. The government action coupled with MLN resource availability indirectly encouraged a continuing increase of MLN violence until 1971. By 1971, the government, using the election lull in the MLN's spiralling violence, enhanced its counterterrorist effort through inclusion of the armed focus and increased focus on effective intelligence. When the MLN announced its renewal of violence in December 1971, the government was correct in its method and timing. The ensuing "battle" was fought on the government's terms; the MLN was extinct by the end of 1972.

Similarly, although ineffective government policy did not provide for continued increases in FLQ violence after the October Crisis,²¹⁴ this case is illustrative of timing and method of government policy. Prior to the October Crisis, there were numerous instances of inappropriate government countermeasures conducted in conjunction with support withdrawal from the FLQ constituency. Police dragnets typically included search and seizure without warrant, and arrest without charge. The net result of these actions was reconsolidation of the FLQ's relationship with their constituency and increasing FLQ violence.

When the October Crisis occurred, the government reacted as previously, but to even greater degree, as the War Measures Act suspended the Canadian Declaration of Rights. As previously, the result was increased support for the FLQ. The government, however, was lucky. When Laporte was executed on 17 October, the FLQ exceeded ALOV, and their constituency's support was withdrawn. After the execution, consequently, these same government actions that were ineffective prior to the execution, proved to be extremely effective. The government was fortunate in the coincidence of their timing.

The German government was not so lucky, managing, through lack of method, to recreate a defeated enemy. The RAF made effective use of publicity once their historical leadership was in prison. When Meins died in his prison cell, the government was painted

²¹⁴In this case, the FLQ exceeded ALOV, reached limitation, and went into decline because of the October Crisis.

as a group of torturing murderers. As noted previously by Aust, this death turned the RAF from a marginal group to a full fledged terrorist organization with a substantial following. The RAF, which should have been a footnote in a history book in 1971, continued to plague the German government until 1992.

C. GOVERNMENT ACTION AND TERRORIST GROUP VIOLENCE

From the case studies, one concludes that correct method and timing are essential to effective government counterterrorist action. In order to understand what constitutes correct method and timing, however, one must first consider the effects of incorrect government action on terrorist group violence.

Crenshaw notes that the government plays a role in pushing certain individuals into violent opposition,²¹⁵ as governments often overreact to violence. Niedhardt explains that this overreaction is a response to the terrorist group's collision with a general taboo against violence, as well as with the modern state's claim to monopoly on violence.²¹⁶ The government's overreaction creates a climate in which a precipitating event may push those wavering on the edge into a terrorist group. That precipitating event is often associated with the death of a comrade. Crenshaw finds that the single most common emotion that drives individuals into terrorism is vengeance on the behalf of a comrade or the constituency.²¹⁷ The German case is illustrative.

²¹⁵Crenshaw, "Psychology of Political Terrorism," 394.

²¹⁶Neidhardt, "Left-Wing and Right-Wing," 215.

²¹⁷Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 394.

On 11 April 1968, Rudi Dutschke was wounded by a mentally subnormal and professed anti-communist. Although no political implications existed, the hysteria of the time soon turned the shooting into an attack by the establishment. Becker describes this volatile climate in that amid cries of "violence against property but not people," others saw no reason why they should be so restrictive when their friends were assaulted, arrested, and shot.²¹⁸ On 2 June 1967, when Benno Ohnesorg was killed by police, the climate got uglier. Baumann described the mood:

The turning point of the state apparatus, which was concretized in Ohnesorg's and Rudi's cases, proved that the state was ready to do anything and that its fascist face appeared as soon as it felt in danger for whatever reason.²¹⁹

The consequence of these events was an increase in violent protest. An increasing number of individuals began to turn to terrorist groups in reaction.

As mentioned previously, Holger Meins' death during a hunger strike on 9 Nov 1974 had tremendous impact within the RAF, as well as other German terrorists. Speitel asserted that the "death of Holger Meins and the decision to take to the gun were one and the same. Sober thought was impossible by now; it was simply the emotional drive of the last few months reacting."²²⁰ Klein expressed a similar reaction:

If all I needed for not only propagating the armed struggle, but also for taking it up myself was the right 'kick,' then Holger Meins was this 'kick.' With his death my

²¹⁸Becker, *Hitler's Children*, 49.

²¹⁹della Porta, "Political Socialization," 269.

²²⁰Ibid., 285.

sense of powerlessness in front of the state grew so much that I felt overwhelmed. I had enough of legal politics and I was ready to fight.²²¹

With each death the violence level rose, and more individuals joined the struggle. The government becomes the terrorist group's best recruiter, as observed by a 25 year old Uruguayan electrician, "for every man who falls five more join."²²²

This type of government reaction, in effect, provides justification for the individual terrorist's use of violence. One Italian terrorist remarked that "we reacted with stones against those who had guns and squat candles and clubs. The difference for me was a justification: it legitimized the defensive use of violence."²²³ Experience with government violence provided for continued violence. Another Italian terrorist felt that:

the qualitative jump in the use of violence produced an internalization of the idea that violence was legitimate for any communist militant, that it was a legitimate instrument, a practice of everyday life.²²⁴

This government reaction provided a mechanism with which terrorists were able to overcome their moral dilemma against the use of violence.

Government reaction, consequently, created an environment that perpetuated the terrorist group. RAF member Ulrike Scholze found that:

A certain psychological disposition is a pre-condition of joining. You have to be emotionally convinced that all attempts at reform simply stabilize the present system

²²¹Quoted in della Porta, "Political Socialization," 273.

²²²Quoted in Gilio, *Tupamaros*, 78.

²²³Ibid., 268.

²²⁴Ibid., 270.

of society and consolidate capitalism. And the harmony of reason and emotions which then exists is the pre-condition of resolute action. Then the prosecuting authorities put pressure on you, and that confirms all you thought. And the effect of sensational press reports and descriptions such as 'Public Enemy Number 1' from government sources is that it gives you the strength to continue your actions.²²⁵

Similarly, Sendic noted of government reaction to the MLN that "first came the repression, then our response."²²⁶

The climate created by the government is one in which the terrorist group's violence is perceived as being justified. Post argues that government retaliation exaggerates the importance of the terrorist group and justifies their actions.²²⁷ Similarly, Bandura observes that extreme government reaction can produce effects that are worse than the terrorism itself.²²⁸ Post concludes that as the response justifies and reaffirms the terrorist group's violence, increased violence is promoted.²²⁹

Government action as it creates the perception of legitimacy within the terrorist group, reinforces the perception of group's legitimacy within its constituency. This is important in that it elevates the constituency's perception that terrorist group can, in fact, achieve the goals that the constituency was unable to achieve. This "effective" terrorist

²²⁵Quoted in Ibid., 121.

²²⁶Quoted in Christian, "Uruguayan Clears Up," A5.

²²⁷Post, "Rewarding Fire With Fire," 113.

²²⁸Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement," 169.

²²⁹Post, "Rewarding Fire With Fire," 113.

group, consequently, receives more support. This increased support provides for increased violence.

The result is a cycle of violence between the terrorist group and the government, a cycle that continually moves upward. Klein explained that:

It's the crazy reactions of the state which have made the armed underground into a hydra. Every time the state has arrested someone, it has given birth to five new members of the underground. Telling people to give themselves up will never be a solution. That's why it's vital to break this vicious circle and give people a way out.²³⁰

As the government overreacts to each terrorist group action, more individuals are pushed into terrorism, and the terrorist group reacts with more violence. The terrorist group's increased violence, consequently, creates the conditions for an increase in the government's violence. The cycle continues.

The government must break this cycle. As the violence increases, causing an excessive and inappropriate government reaction, the terrorist group's strategy is successful. Knutson comments:

While government tends to play as if the game is discrete and what matters is merely the reestablishment of the total monopoly of force, the terrorists know that the game is continuous and that it is the government's modus operandi, not the event's outcome, which is the real issue.²³¹

²³⁰Klein, "Memoirs of International Terrorist," 58.

²³¹Knutson, "The Terrorists' Dilemmas," 205.

This successful strategy raises the terrorist group's and decreases the government's influence relative to each other. Can the terrorist group win this battle? No! They can however, raise the government's cost for victory.

In summary, a terrorist group's life cycle is a function of the interaction between the terrorist group and government as each attempts to resolve its respective dilemma. The life cycle's shape is determined by the side that achieves the most effective solution. The next section considers application of this theory to counterterrorist policy.

XIV. COUNTERTERRORIST POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The theory developed above provides a framework with which to understand the rise and fall of terrorist groups. The purpose of this section is to apply that understanding to the design of counterterrorist policy. As presented in Figure 11, the conceptual goal of counterterrorist policy is to suppress a terrorist group's life cycle in scope and time. The practical goal is to force the terrorist group into decline.




Figure 11. THE GOAL OF COUNTERTERRORIST POLICY.

A. COMBATTING TERRORIST GROUPS - DETER, COMPEL, OR MANAGE?

Theories of terrorist group decline fall into three broad categories: those that emphasize organization, those that emphasize capability, and those that emphasize

strategy. Oots argues that formation and disintegration of terrorist groups are a product of seven organizational factors: entrepreneurial leadership, recruitment, coalition formation, outside support, competition, and internal cohesion.²³² The terrorist group disintegrates based on their failure to achieve these factors.

Ross and Gurr argue that terrorism subsides as a function of government action (preemption and deterrence), burnout in which the members commitment to the group and its purposes declines, and backlash in which political support for the terrorist group's actions and objectives declines.²³³ The terrorist group's violence subsides as a result of their declining capability.

Crenshaw argues that terrorist groups decline as a result of the interplay of three related factors: the government's response to their terrorism, the strategic choices of the terrorist group, and the terrorist group's organizational resources.²³⁴ The terrorist group declines as a function of strategic choices made on the basis of these factors' influence. She concludes that the effect of these factors need not be permanent, but may induce "cycles of terrorism."

Review of the above theories groups factors related to the decline of terrorist groups into three broad categories: the terrorist group, the terrorist group's support, and the government. These categories are consistent with the results of the cases studies which

²³²Oots, "Organizational Perspectives," 139-52.

²³³Ross and Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides," 405-27.

²³⁴Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," 69-87.

identified three conditions for terrorist group decline. First, the terrorist group's support must be depleted; e.g., the constituency is withdrawn, internal resources are limited, and sponsorship is unavailable. Second, the government's counterterrorist action must be correct in its timing and method. Third, shifting priorities within the terrorist group, from strategic to survival motives, result in their execution of a critical event.

Terrorist groups place governments in a difficult situation. Although terrorist groups are weak relative to the government, they can be perceived as being extremely effective. The government, in order to maintain its legitimacy, must alter that perception. To do so requires effective and correct government action. Since terrorist groups are political organizations, governments potentially can apply international relations theory on conflict management - defense, deterrence, compellence, and crisis management - to this subnational interaction.²³⁵ The basic question is whether or not these theoretical constructs can be used to take advantage of the conditions for a terrorist group's decline.

Snyder defines defense as policy which forcefully prevents an opponent's achievement of their physical objectives.²³⁶ Effective defense makes attack impossible. Defense can be defensive in nature; e.g., fortification, or offensive. Snyder identifies two offensive tactics designed to defend. In prevention, one attacks first in order to remove

²³⁵See Jack A. Goldstone, "Deterrence in Rebellions and Revolutions," in *Perspectives on Deterrence*, eds., P. C. Stern et al, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 222-50, for one application of state based theory to subnational conflict.

²³⁶Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961.) See Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism," 16-19, for application of Snyder's theory to terrorist groups.

an opponent's ability to attack in the future. In preemption, one strikes first in order to prevent an imminent attack by an opponent.

Snyder defines deterrence as a policy designed to convince an opponent that the costs of action far outweigh any benefits that might be gained, and identifies two mechanisms for its achievement. In denial, the immediate costs of attack are raised and the opponent faces the prospect of paying too high a price for any gains. In retaliation, an opponent is threatened with an effective response after their attack occurs and this counterattack raises the costs above the benefits.

Huth divides deterrence into several types, two of which are relevant to this argument.²³⁷ General deterrence is a situation in which resources are allocated and forces deployed in the absence of an immediate threat. Laws, police forces, and internal security mechanisms are means of general deterrence within a state. Immediate deterrence is the mobilization and deployment of resources and forces in response to an imminent threat. Police task units and crisis action procedures are means of immediate deterrence within a state.

Schelling describes compellence as a strategy in which one coerces an opponent by the threat of action in the absence of compliance.²³⁸ In contrast to deterrence in which a threat is designed to prevent an opponent from doing something, a compellent threat is

²³⁷Paul K. Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 15-18.

²³⁸Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 69-78.

intended to make an adversary do something. Compellence is actively implemented, implying that punishment continues until the opponent acts, rather than if he acts. Compliance suspends the compeller's action, but not necessarily the threat.

Although terrorist group and government interaction can be considered with respect to these constructs - a terrorist group attempts to compel a government into some form of change, while a government attempts to prevent or deter a terrorist group from its violence - several problems exist from the government's perspective. First, each construct requires a target. Terrorist groups with their underground infrastructures are inherently difficult to target.

Second, each construct requires a credible threat to be effective. Huth defines a credible threat as one in which sufficient capability is backed by the will necessary to use that capability.²³⁹ The will of a government to suppress a terrorist group is unquestionable. Because of targeting difficulties, however, the capability to combat terrorist groups is often insufficient. This insufficiency results from intelligence deficiencies, as well as ineffective methods. Terrorist groups recognize this fact.

Third, the existence of a terrorist group implies the failure of these constructs. General deterrence fails when the terrorist group forms, regardless of their recognition that society in general, and government in particular, condemns their existence. Defense, immediate deterrence, and any attempts at compellence, fail with each act of terrorist group violence.

²³⁹Huth, *Extended Deterrence*, 4.

Fourth, Schelling implies that deterrence often depends on relinquishing the initiative to the other side. Loss of initiative is hazardous to the government's counterterrorist effort. The government's legitimacy rests on the perception of their initiative relative to the terrorist group. In addition, the side that controls the initiative is the side that controls the cycle of violence.

If anything, the terrorist group uses these constructs more effectively than does the government. The government, in a sense, assists in their use. Schelling notes that, in an apparent paradox of deterrence, rationality and control are not always useful.²⁴⁰ To illustrate, he uses a scene from Conrad's *A Secret Agent* in which the terrorist's bomb maker, who kept a vial of nitroglycerine in his pocket, was queried as to why the police would believe he would blow himself up:

In the last instance it is character alone that makes for one's safety...I have the means to make myself deadly, but that by itself, you understand, is absolutely nothing in the way of protection. What is effective is the belief those people have in my will to use the means. That's their impression. It is absolute. Therefore I am deadly.²⁴¹

The government's mistake is their propagation of the myth of the terrorist group's irrationality. The government, consequently, enhances the deterrent effect of the terrorist group's violence.

The existence of a terrorist group places government in a crisis. On one hand, the government must suppress the terrorist group's violence in order to retain its legitimacy.

²⁴⁰Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 37.

²⁴¹Joseph Conrad, *The Secret Agent*, (New York: Signet, 1983), 67-68.

One the other hand, that violence must be suppressed in a way that does not jeopardize the government's legitimacy. With the failure of defense, deterrence, and compellence, the question becomes whether or not the government can manage the crisis precipitated by a terrorist group.

B. MANAGING TERRORIST GROUPS

This part develops the conceptual basis for efforts designed to manage terrorist groups. This part is not intended to be prescriptive, but instead provides broad considerations for counterterrorist policy. The goal is to use understanding of the theory developed above in order to create and manage the conditions under which a terrorist group declines.

As discussed previously, support depletion, government action, and a critical event are necessary conditions for a terrorist group's decline. Realizing that an event may not be recognized as being critical except in hindsight, is there a means of creating the conditions in which any terrorist group action becomes a critical event? In other words, can support and government action be manipulated so that the terrorist group is induced into an action in which they can be targeted effectively?

The first counterterrorist policy consideration concerns the terrorist group's support. From the cases studies, three aspects of this support are relevant: internal resources, sponsorship, and constituency. The government's initial goal must be to interdict and compromise the terrorist group's internal resources. For example, the arrests of Mohnhaupt and Klar led to discovery of 13 major caches throughout Germany. This

arrest and discovery resulted in two years of inactivity while the RAF reorganized and recovered. Similarly, laws enacted in Italy made it necessary for landlords to record each new lease, increasing the difficulty for Red Brigadists to obtain safehouses.²⁴²

Perhaps the most important, but unexplored, issue in this area is the compromise of a terrorist group's finances. As became apparent in the aftermath of the World Trade Center bombing in March 1993, terrorist groups move finances through the international banking system. The ANO is reported to have branched into legal investments and business ventures to support the organization. Seale notes that by 1988 Abu Nidal controlled over \$400 million in assets derived largely through extortion, real estate ventures, and arms sales.²⁴³

The government's second goal with respect to the terrorist group's support is to eliminate any sponsorship. Since sponsors typically are states, they are subject to the processes which govern international interactions. Specifically, state sponsors can be deterred and compelled. International law governing support of terrorist activity is one type of general deterrent. The United States' linkage of terrorist sponsorship to Most Favored Nation status is an example of a compellent. The United States' bombing of

²⁴²Allison Jamieson, "The Italian Experience," *Counter-Terrorism in Europe: Implications of 1992, Conflict Studies*, n. 238, (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1991), 16.

²⁴³Seale, *Abu Nidal*, 202-05. Finance operations were controlled by his SAS Foreign Trade and Investment Company in Warsaw.

Libya in April 1986 is an example of deterrent retaliation which resulted in Libyan withdrawal of support from ANO, and, consequently led to ANO decline.

The government's third goal with respect to terrorist group support is to create a climate in which the constituency withdraws support. Certain portions of the constituency can be coerced into withdrawing their support. Other portions can be paid. For example, the Quebec government offered rewards for information with varying effects. These rewards, however, led to the breakup of a few FLQ cells, primarily during their decline phase.

Perhaps the most important, and again unexplored, issue in this area concerns reform. Since terrorist groups rise from social movements that are unable to achieve their goals, reform focussed on those goals goes a long way toward removing the constituency's requirement for the terrorist group. Gurr argues that main aim and effect of the process of reform is to undermine the terrorist group's basis of support.²⁴⁴ This reform must be focussed on the constituency's grievances, and not the terrorist group's demands. The result of such reform is that the terrorist group's ALOV is lowered. When a bombing that killed a bus load of school children was necessary to exceed its ALOV prior to reform, afterward only a bank robbery may be necessary.

The second counterterrorist policy consideration concerns government action. Crenshaw observes that the government's task is to promote disintegration [of the terrorist

²⁴⁴Gurr, "Terrorism in Democracies," 98.

group] without provoking an escalation of violence.²⁴⁵ From the case studies, one concludes that government action must avoid excessiveness and inappropriateness and that timing and method are important in achieving those goals.

In three of four case studies, government action became effective after the terrorist group exceeded their ALOV, causing a constituency withdrawal.²⁴⁶ In the case of the FLQ, the government used similar types of action throughout the FLQ's life cycle: police sweeps, search without warrant, arrest without charge, and rewards. Prior to the October Crisis 1970, this government action served to solidify the FLQ's relationship with their constituency. When Cross and Laporte were kidnapped, the government reacted as previously, but to greater degree. In the initial stages of October Crisis, government action again increased support for the FLQ. When Laporte was executed, however, the FLQ exceeded its ALOV, and its constituency's support was withdrawn. From this point, the same government action that was condemned only days earlier was overwhelmingly supported by the public. The government was lucky in the coincidence of their timing.

Similarly, when the RAF exceeded its ALOV with the Baader-Meinhof 14 day bombing spree in May 1972, government action was effective regardless of the impact on the public. The entire police force was mobilized on a search operation of a scale unknown in Germany. Chief Commissioner of the Federal Criminal Investigation Office Horst Herold commented that:

²⁴⁵Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism," 24.

²⁴⁶Government action had little effect against the ANO.

I have never seen such a high degree of identification between citizens and police as I did that day. I flew over some of the roads by helicopter myself, and we really met nothing but drivers waving to us everywhere. It's hard to imagine now just how deep the shock of those attacks went. The explicit aim of our operation was to make a big splash in the water and get the fish moving. It surprised the television people; they sent teams everywhere. It was the first and biggest public operation ever known, and has not been repeated.²⁴⁷

This operation flushed the fish who were then turned in by their erstwhile sympathizers.

As illustrated by the MLN case, correct timing coupled with incorrect method provided for ineffective government action. When the MLN exceeded its ALOV with its diplomatic kidnapping campaign and execution of Mitrone in July 1970, its constituency's support was withdrawn. Porzecanski notes, however, that the government's efforts were conducted clumsily, at all hours of the night, many times without appropriate warrants, creating great resentment, and failing to turn up any Tupamaro.²⁴⁸ These poorly targeted and illegal government actions reconstituted the MLN's relationship with its constituency, raised its ALOV to a higher level, and allowed continued violence.

In late 1971, when the MLN once again exceeded its ALOV, the government was ready. This time government action was effective in timing and method. The government took advantage of an election lull in MLN violence to improve its methods to include an increased emphasis on intelligence. When the MLN renewed its campaign, government action targeted MLN membership, infrastructure, and resources, avoiding the

²⁴⁷Stefan Aust, *The Baader-Meinhof Group: The Inside Story of a Phenomenon*, trans., A. Bell, (London: The Bodley Head, 1987), 214.

²⁴⁸Porzecanski, *Uruguay's Tupamaros*, 56.

broad impact of the previous attempts. The government also used the declaration of an internal state of war to "legalize" its actions. By the end of the year, the MLN was extinct.

From these cases, what constitutes correct government policy? What prevents its action from being excessive and inappropriate? First, effective counterterrorist policy applies a tit-for-tat logic. Axelrod describes tit-for-tat in the context of game theory as a policy of cooperating on the first move and then doing whatever the other player did on the previous move.²⁴⁹ In the context of the terrorist group and government cycle of violence, this means that the government avoids approaching its acceptable level of violence until after the terrorist group has exceeded its ALOV. By doing so, the government waits until the terrorist group drives up the government's acceptable level, allowing the government to counter the terrorist group at a higher level of violence. If the government exceeds its acceptable before the terrorist group, then the terrorist group can operate effectively at a higher level of violence.

In ideal conditions, the government maintains its acceptable level above the terrorist group ALOV. The area between the two is an area in which the government can act, but the terrorist group cannot. Any terrorist group action is responded to by the government by tit-for-tat action. In less ideal conditions, the government's acceptable level and terrorist group's ALOV are at the same level. In this case, an impasse is reached in

²⁴⁹Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 13.

which neither side can act more effectively than the other. In the worst conditions, the terrorist group's ALOV is higher than the government's acceptable level. In this case, the area between the two is an area where the terrorist group can operate, but the government cannot. Any government action is countered by a higher level of terrorist violence.

In order to enhance their success in this tit-for-tat policy, the government must initiate efforts, independent of terrorist group action, that raise and maintain their acceptable level of violence. Such efforts focus on altering society's perception of what is acceptable. By painting the terrorist group as extremely vicious and the terrorist group's goals as extremely repressive, the government can increase their acceptable level.

Second, effective counterterrorist policy is not exclusively military, but relies heavily on political action as well. Hutchinson notes that although the causes of terrorism are political, its response is usually by military [or police] force.²⁵⁰ The key political action is reform that targets the goals of the terrorist group's constituency and lowers its ALOV. Additional political action focusses on removing any sponsors the terrorist group might have.

Third, effective counterterrorist policy is specifically targeted. Instead of clumsy, broad police actions that alienate society in general, government policy, whether political or military, must be surgical in nature. The focus of the government's efforts must be the

²⁵⁰Hutchinson, "Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism," 392.

terrorist groups membership, infrastructure, and hard core constituency. Blunt efforts outside that range are counterproductive.

Fourth, effective counterterrorist policy adheres to the rule of law. Wilkinson identifies the "protection and maintenance of liberal democracy and the rule of law" as the primary objective of counterterrorist policy.²⁵¹ Similarly, Bandura notes that democratic societies face the dilemma of moral justification of counterterrorist measures without sacrificing their fundamental principles and standards of conduct.²⁵² Policies that ignore law call into question the government's legitimacy, and put society in the position of choosing between the lesser of two evils.

The final counterterrorist policy consideration concerns the terrorist group's critical event. Successful completion of the first two considerations creates conditions under which the terrorist group must act because their survival is threatened. At this point, government policy focusses on exacerbating the severe tensions that already exist in the group. Although direct action is difficult, indirect efforts can be effective. The *pentiti* laws in Italy in which terrorists received sentence reductions for confessions and collaboration were extremely successful. In Patrizio Peci's case, his evidence led to the arrest of 85 Red Brigadists and discovery of arms stores, documentary material, and

²⁵¹Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism & the Liberal State*, second ed., (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 125

²⁵²Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement," 166.

bases.²⁵³ Another option suggested by Knutson is to offer limited reform of the terrorists grievances, thus "erod[ing] the isolated desperation" that fuels the need to establish their legitimacy.²⁵⁴ Each option causes group fragmentation as moderate and burned out members depart. Either option enhances the terrorist group's tensions to the point where the need for violent action becomes overwhelming.

That next action is a critical event. The ALOV is lowered. The support is withdrawn. The terrorist group is tense and fragmenting, conditions under which effective decision making is difficult. The government is prepared. The conditions are set for a managed failure of immediate deterrence in which the terrorist group can be forced into decline.

There is a danger. Post notes that a terrorist group in such a situation has little to lose.²⁵⁵ The danger with such a group, given the capability, is in a spectacular action designed to place the terrorist group back on the scoreboard. The government must be ready. If they miss, the consequences could be counterproductive, creating the conditions under which the terrorist group can continue increasing its violence.

In summary, Crenshaw notes that "terrorism is likely to end when the bonds that link members of the group to each other are dissolved or when beliefs that justify violence

²⁵³Allison Jamieson, *The Heart Attacked: Terrorism and Conflict in the Italian State*, (New York: Marion Boyars, 1989), 179.

²⁵⁴Knutson, "The Terrorists' Dilemmas," 218.

²⁵⁵Post, "Group and Organisational Dynamics," 314.

break down or are discredited."²⁵⁶ The terrorist group and its members, ultimately, must give up terrorism. The point to be made here is that it is possible to manage the conditions under which terrorists make or are forced to make that decision. Perhaps the most important conclusion for this thesis is a terrorist group's lack of control provides a mechanism with which a terrorist group can be controlled.

²⁵⁶Crenshaw, "Decisions to Use Terrorism," 41

XV. CONCLUSIONS

There are several ironies associated with the rise and fall of terrorist groups. First, terrorist groups are doomed to fail...if left alone. Once organizational motives take priority over instrumental ones terrorism becomes self-defeating and survival-threatening for the terrorist group. Since this priority shift occurs as a natural consequence of its internal dynamics, the seeds of a terrorist group's destruction exist within the group itself. Factors external to the terrorist group, however, may suppress germination of those seeds and allow the group to survive.

Second, governments cannot leave terrorist groups alone. Governments exist in a difficult situation with respect to terrorist groups. Government action must suppress the terrorist group's violence in order to retain its legitimacy. If government action is too violent, however, it runs the risk of jeopardizing its legitimacy. Government action that is excessive and inappropriate to the situation may be the most significant factor that suppresses germination of the seeds of a terrorist group's self-destruction.

Third, the side that determines the shape of a terrorist group's life cycle is the side that best resolves its dilemma. A terrorist campaign is a competition for influence between the terrorist group and the government. The terrorist group attempts to influence its constituency to provide support, the government to concede to its demands, and the government's constituency to withdraw support from the government. Similarly, the

government attempts to influence its constituency to support its counterterrorist policies, the terrorist group to cease its violence, and the terrorist group's constituency to withdraw support. The winner of that competition, ultimately, is the side with the most effective influence.

Understanding of the dynamic nature of terrorist group life cycles may be more important to the United States today, than in the recent past. The potential for the rise of terrorist groups may increase as a result of the instability of the current international environment. In addition, the United States, as the preeminent world power may become the focus of terrorism by states and groups that have no other alternative. As a result, the United States, as it attempts to enlarge its influence, may become involved with campaigns of terrorism.

This thesis suggests a mechanism with which such campaigns can be managed. The key to successful management of a terrorist groups is to understand the nature of its life cycle, and then to use this understanding to influence the conditions under which the terrorist group declines. In the final analysis, a terrorist group quits terrorism when it is ready. The government's goal is to convince the terrorist group that it is ready.

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